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Resolved: On balance, the rise of China is beneficial to the interests of the United States.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS	2
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY SAAD ASAD.....	5
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY JESSICA BAILEY	15
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY DAN MIYAMOTO	28
TOPIC ANALYSIS BY ADAM TORSON.....	39
FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE	48
THE “RISE OF CHINA” DEFINED	48
CHINA IS POISED TO CATCH UP TO THE UNITED STATES’ MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER	49
U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA DEFINED	50
AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE	51
<i>ALIGNMENT OF U.S. AND CHINESE INTERESTS</i>	<i>51</i>
CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES BROADLY AGREE ON MOST OF AMERICA’S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA.....	51
THE U.S. SHOULD WELCOME A MORE ASSERTIVE CHINA AS A PARTNER IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL ISSUES.....	52
IN THE MID-2000S, CHINA RESPONDED TO U.S. POLICY BY TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN GLOBAL ISSUES	53
THE U.S. AND CHINA ARE UNLIKELY TO GO TO WAR BECAUSE THEY CAN PURSUE THEIR INTERESTS WITHOUT POSING A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO EACH OTHER.....	54
<i>CHINESE INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER</i>	<i>55</i>
THE RISE OF CHINA NEED NOT BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE WESTERN-LIBERAL ORDER	55
THE US CAN MANAGE CHINA’S RISE BY EXERCISING ITS INFLUENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POLITICAL ORDER.....	56
THE WESTERN POLITICAL ORDER IS UNIQUELY DIFFICULT TO OVERTURN	57
THE WESTERN ECONOMIC ORDER IS PREMISED ON NON-DISCRIMINATION AND OPEN MARKETS, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SYSTEM MORE EASILY.....	58
THE WESTERN ORDER IS GOVERNED BY A COALITION OF LIKE-MINDED STATES, MAKING IT HARDER TO OVERTHROW	59
THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN ORDER IS LARGELY RULE-BASED AND INSTITUTIONAL, MAKING IT EASIER TO INTEGRATE RATHER THAN OVERTHROW IT	60
CHINA HAS STRONG INCENTIVES TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER	61
CHINA MUST MAINTAIN ITS INTEGRATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO HAVE ACCESS TO TRADE RULES THAT SUPPORT ITS GROWTH	62
<i>MILITARY DETERRENCE.....</i>	<i>63</i>
WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY	63
TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, CHINA MUST MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY	64

U.S. POWER CAN DETER CHINESE AGGRESSION65

A CHINESE DRIVE FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND INFEASIBLE66

THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCE WILL HELP IMPROVE MUTUAL DETERRENCE
.....67

CHINA'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN
AGGRESSIVE MOVE68

THE BIGGEST THREAT TO U.S./CHINA RELATIONS COMES FROM EXAGGERATING THREATS69

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION..... 70

TRYING TO SLOW CHINA'S RISE WOULD TRIGGER ECONOMIC WARFARE THAT WOULD HURT
EVERYONE70

ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST CHINA WOULD BE UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OTHER STATES
WOULD NOT SUPPORT SANCTIONS71

HISTORICAL COMPARISONS..... 72

NOT ALL POWER TRANSITIONS ARE PRONE TO MILITARY CONFLICT72

CHINA'S "PEACEFUL RISE" STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO REASSURE CHINA'S NEIGHBORS AND
PREVENT COALITIONS OF HOSTILE POWERS FROM FORMING73

TRYING TO SLOW CHINA'S RISE WOULD BE A MISTAKE BECAUSE CHINA IS NOT AS AGGRESSIVE
AS THE SOVIET UNION WAS74

CHINA'S RISE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE SAME TYPE OF GEOPOLITICAL THREAT THAT SOVIET
EXPANSION DID75

THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS LESS
PRONOUNCED THAN IT WAS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE COLD WAR
.....76

ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS..... 77

CHINA IS COMMITTED TO THE POSITION THE TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA, AND THE U.S. IS
COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TAIWAN'S STATUS77

KOREAN REUNIFICATION IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD ALLOW US TO
WITHDRAW A MILITARY PRESENCE THAT IS PROVOCATIVE TO CHINA78

A STRONG ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST79

IT IS IN CHINA'S INTEREST TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CONTAINING IRANIAN
NUCLEAR AMBITIONS80

CHINA HAS GENERALLY VIEWED THE U.S./JAPAN ALLIANCE AS A STABILIZING FORCE RATHER
THAN A THREAT81

NEGATIVE EVIDENCE..... **82**

HEGEMONIC TRANSITION..... 82

TRANSITIONS OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ARE INHERENTLY PRONE TO
CONFLICT82

THE RISE OF CHINA WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO SOME LEVEL OF CONFLICT.....83

SEVERAL FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA IN THE
NEAR FUTURE84

CHINA'S RISE IS UNLIKELY TO BE PEACEFUL BECAUSE IT'S NEIGHBORS AND THE UNITED
STATES CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN OF ITS INTENTIONS.....85

BECAUSE STATES CAN'T DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY
CAPABILITIES, CHINA CANNOT MAINTAIN PEACE SIMPLY BY DEVELOPING DEFENSIVE
CAPABILITIES86

CHINA'S RECENT BEHAVIOR CANNOT BE USED TO PREDICT THE FUTURE AS ACCURATELY AS
THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.....87

CHINA WILL REASONABLY INTERPRET U.S. POSTURE AS AGGRESSIVE.....88

RECENT HISTORY MAKES IT REASONABLE TO INTERPRET U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS WARLIKE...89

CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS MAKE CHINA'S RISE DESTABILIZING.....90

THE PREDOMINANCE OF REALIST THINKING IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MAY MAKE FEARS OF
CONFLICT A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY91

INTEGRATION INTO GLOBAL SOCIETY 92

CHINA IS RESISTENT TO MANY ASPECTS OF THE STATUS QUO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.....92

WHILE CHINA ACCEPTS SOME INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, IT IS RESISTANT TO MANY NORMS
OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.....93

CHINESE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 94

CHINA MAY HAVE TO TAKE ON MORE OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE THAN IT IS COMFORTABLE WITH IF
THE U.S. DOES NOT RESTORE ITS LEGITIMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.....94

THE INWARD-LOOKING CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE OF CHINESE LEADERS MAY LIMIT THEIR
ENGAGEMENT NI GLOBAL POLITICS95

CHINA'S INWARD-LOOKING TENDENCIES CAN CAUSE IT TO DISREGARD ITS RESPONSIBILITIES
AS A GREAT POWER.....96

CLIMATE CHANGE WILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR CHINA'S RISE97

REGIONAL HEGEMONY 98

CHINA IS LIKELY TO TRY TO EXPAND IT'S POWER IN ASIA BY PUSHING THE U.S. OUT98

THE UNITED STATES IS LIKELY TO TRY TO WEAKEN CHINA TO MAINTAIN ITS STATUS AS THE
WORLD'S ONLY REGIONAL HEGEMON.....99

CHINA'S NEIGHBORS ARE LIKELY TO ALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT CHINA'S RISE
INTO A REGIONAL HEGEMON.....100

THERE ARE SEVERAL AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA COULD BE DRAGGED INTO
A LAND WAR.....101

CHINA'S NEIGHBORS..... 102

IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF CHINA'S NEIGHBOR'S TO PLAY CHINA AND THE U.S. OFF OF EACH
OTHER102

CHINA'S INCREASINGLY HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS A THREAT TO THE U.S. POSITION
IN EAST ASIA.....103

CHINA'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY WORRISOME
OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS104

THE DRIVE TO TAKE A STRONG LINE TO SHORE UP DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME HAS
CAUSED CHINA TO HARM ITS ALREADY TENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN105

CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREA MAY BE A RESULT OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEED TO
MAINTAIN A HARD-LINE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS106

IN THE NEAR FUTURE CHINA WILL PRESENT A SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT TO AUSTRALIA107

TAIWAN REMAINS A POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT FOR CONFLICT THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO
NUCLEAR WAR108

RECENT U.S./CHINESE TENSIONS 109

IN RECENT YEARS CHINA'S POSTURE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN LESS PEACEFUL
.....109

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD TENSE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA.....110

NATIONALIST PRESSURES IN RECENT YEARS HAVE MADE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY MORE
ASSERTIVE.....111

NEW VOICES IN CHINESE POLICY-MAKING LEND CREDENCE TO NATIONALIST CRITICISMS.....112

Topic Analysis by Saad Asad

Definitions:

On balance- This implies the resolution is comparative. The resolution admits that there are both costs and benefits to China's rise. Pro and Con sides must evaluate the costs and benefits and weigh them against each other. Weighing will be essential. For example, one could argue China's rise will economically benefit the U.S. by bringing in cheap products. However, the opposing debater could state economic benefits are outweighed by China's potential military threat. Hence, students should be prepared to compare benefits and costs to fully analyze whether China's rise is beneficial or not.

Admittedly though, the burden seems more onerous for the PRO side. The CON side can provide a wide and diverse range of arguments to fuel the belief that China's rise is a threat. While the PRO side can at best provide some marginal benefits but must remain on the offense. This means that the PRO should actively pre-empt some of the more popular CON arguments since there is far less offense for the PRO to claim.

Although there are definitely benefits to China's rise, there are obviously going to be a lot more questions and concerns with the rise of another great power in a once contentious part of the world.

the rise of China- This is fairly obvious and is referring to China's quickened economic growth over the past three decades. Once representing less than 1 percent of the world's GDP in the early 1970s, it now represents over 8 percent. And it is set to overtake the world's 1st largest economy, the U.S. by 2016.¹

interests of the U.S.- Interests here is fairly broad. So, debaters can and should include economic, military, or general political interests that the U.S. favors. To narrow one's search, though, debaters should consider the specific interests the U.S. has in the Asia Pacific region. Largely, the U.S. favors to prevent the outbreak of any war, maintain Taiwan's democracy, and sustain economic growth.² Does China's rise impede any of these goals? Those on the PRO side should argue no, while those on the CON should argue that it does.

¹ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/nov/09/china-overtake-us-four-years-oecd>

² http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1300/MR1300.ch10.pdf

I will structure the remainder of the topic analysis as a discussion of the benefits and costs of China's rise to the U.S., starting with the benefits.

Benefits:

The most convincing argument for the PRO side to argue China's rise is beneficial is to argue that both the U.S. and China have similar goals and have no need for confrontation. Both the U.S. and China oppose the further proliferation of nuclear weapons regardless of location. However, China is at further risk if weapons of mass destruction make their way in to the Asia Pacific region. Outside of the region though, China still condemns the use of these dangerous weapons as was exemplified when Syria began mixing chemical weapons a few months ago.³ Prior to this event, China sternly resisted most condemnations of the Syrian regime. Knowing the costs of the use of chemical weapons, though, Syria was forced to stop due to Chinese and Russian influence. Rogue regimes will not listen to America always so China's rise will be of additional assistance in controlling these nation's actions.

Another example is the importance of China in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula. China's rise gives it more cleft in negotiation and more sway over North Korean actions. As Chinese military power increases, it is more difficult for the North Korean regime to pursue violent behavior. Hence, the U.S. and China can more easily cooperate on this front to prevent North Korea from doing anything rash or shortsighted.

Additionally, China has the same goals as the U.S. for the Asia Pacific region. Undoubtedly, China wishes to continue its high growth levels. Any war or violent confrontation would threaten this so they will avoid it at all costs. Further, on the issue of Taiwan, they will avoid military escalation so long as Taiwan does not formally declare independence. If Taiwan continues its ambiguous place in the international arena, then the U.S. has no reason for concern that its interests may be endangered.

Furthermore, China has worked with the U.S on counterterrorism efforts signaling its rise will be beneficial. After 9-11, China adopted UN Security Council resolutions that condemned the attacks, called on all states to combat terrorism, specifically Al-Qaeda, and even demanded Iraq cease obstructing UN-mandated inspections for WMDs.⁴

³ www.nytimes.com/2013/01/08/world/middleeast/chemical-weapons-showdown-with-syria-led-to-rare-accord.html

⁴ <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2011/201109.delisle.911.html>

China also strongly opposes piracy and uses its navy to counteract these threats.⁵ Off the coast of Somalia, the Chinese Navy has effectively curbed pirates as well as closer to home in the Malacca Straits. This provision of naval defenses acts as a public good for all nations wishing to navigate and ship goods freely. Further, this reduces the burden of the American Navy in patrolling and deterring pirates meaning China's rise is indeed beneficial.

Next, we must also consider China's rise provides a new export market for U.S. businesses. The potential for over a billion new customers will expand and enrich American citizens. Not to mention, American citizens deeply benefit from cheap Chinese imports that save them money. These deep economic ties mean China is, in fact, dependent on the U.S. since it relies on exports for its economic growth. Nor do we need to worry about China being an economic threat. It is deeply invested in U.S. securities so any disruption of the dollar value would also deal a severe blow to the Chinese economy.⁶ As proof of this interdependence, after the financial crisis in 2008, the Chinese were still ready to continue to buy U.S. government debt. Failing to do so would dampen the recovery for Americans and consequently, slow Chinese exports.

We should also make sure not overestimate China's economic growth. Indeed it is tremendous and quick-paced, but there is also much inefficiency. For example, Beijing spends about 30% of its annual GDP on bank bailouts due to so many nonperforming loans. The financial system of China is still one of a developing country while America's is still much more robust. In consideration of inefficiencies like this, the American economy is much stronger.

Overall, China's rise will be beneficial because of the new markets available. It will not threaten American interests simply due to economic interdependence and the American economy's overwhelming efficiency.

Also, unlike the former USSR, China does not pose an ideological rival. Although it is nominally communist, its economy performs like that of many capitalist nations. It does not seek to export its ideology either like the Soviet Union did with satellite states.⁷ Most notably in contrast with the USSR, China engages in the U.S.-centric neoliberal world order. It engages with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. China depends more on access to world markets and institution than we rely on their imports. It does not wish to follow the USSR's path of isolation knowing it would impede growth. To 'rise', China must engage with the

⁵ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8486502.stm>

⁶ http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_glaser_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf

⁷ http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol12no04_0.pdf

institutions that the U.S. and Western order created. It will be difficult to alter these organizations in a way that would not benefit the U.S.

Another way China is told to be threatening is its military rise. But here is another area of contrast with the former USSR, an actual adversary. It has consistently spent 2% of its GDP on military. At no point has China decided to forgo civilian production in favor of an arms race as the former USSR did. It realizes military confrontation would set back Chinese modernization and endanger the Communist Party.⁸

Looking more closely at its military, it would take decades for China to surpass U.S. in military strength. As the world's superpower, the U.S. has basing rights all around the world, top-of-the-class military hardware and technology, aircraft carriers, and space-based platforms. Nor are any of these significantly at risk from Chinese domination. A Western arms embargo has left China to rely on Russian technology which is below that of the West and further, Russia sells this same technology to China's rivals, India and Vietnam.⁹ And Japan, Guam, Korea, and the Philippines are unlikely to replace American military bases with Chinese ones since they themselves are wary of China's rise. Although the Chinese scientific establishment is advanced, it is still far from approaching the technical development that the U.S. has achieved. Lastly, the Chinese military does not have the extensive training that the U.S. military does. Nor has it seen military combat since clashing with Vietnam decades ago. Even their missiles and submarines only pose a threat when close to its coast.¹⁰ So yes, the Chinese military is growing, but it is far from being a threat due to U.S. dominance.

In conclusion, the overwhelming benefit of China's rise is its cooperation on security goals whether state actors like North Korea or non-state actors like terrorists and the economic benefits as well. As listed above, its military is not advanced enough to threaten U.S. interests.

The CON may spend a large portion of their case establishing that China is a military threat. It is important that the PRO debaters stress that this is propagandistic. Chinese military spending, though, large, still cannot compete with America's. At most, it can become a regional hegemony in East Asia, but it cannot become a world superpower. Further, it should be stressed that any Chinese military advancement should be expected from a developing nation in order to increase its prestige. None of its immediate military capabilities threaten the U.S. but are a reaction to what the Chinese fear is containment or encirclement by America and its allies. The development of

⁸ http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_glaser_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf

⁹ <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200707.keidel.assessingchina.html>

¹⁰ <http://www.economist.com/node/21552212>

area-denial weapons only testify to China's defensive purpose. It does not wish for America to involve itself in any conflict over Taiwan or threatening China's coastline where its ports lay.

Regarding some of China's protectionist policies, it would also be hypocritical for the America to criticize them when even in our own development we protected our infant industries so they could economically develop and advance. China is too economically connected with the world and concerned with its own growth to do anything rash that would endanger US interests.

Costs:

The central claim of the CON side should be that China's rise poses a military threat to U.S. interests. Despite China facing no external threat, it has vamped up military spending. Moreover, the U.S. Navy has protected China's commercial interests in the world's sea lines, so there is no need for continued naval expansion. Finally, weapons systems like ballistic missiles are obviously offensive and unnecessary for simply eliminating Somali pirates.¹¹ These advances represent unnecessary military expansion that is obviously meant to counter U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China's military spending has increased by 12% a year and is on course to become the world's largest military spender in 20 years. With its advances, it can disable American bases beyond the first island chain of Japan and the Philippines.¹² Its anti-access/area denial military technology endanger to American bases in Okinawa, South Korea, and Guam. There is no defensive reason for this military spending but rather to subdue American power in the region.

The Economist elaborates on this offensive strategy China will take:

...in 2005, the PLA's *Science of Military Strategy* did not mince its words. Although "active defence is the essential feature of China's military strategy," it said, if "an enemy offends our national interests it means that the enemy has already fired the first shot," in which case the PLA's mission is "to do all we can to dominate the enemy by striking first".¹³

¹¹ <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0712/Five-tough-truths-about-U.S.-China-relations/The-United-States-is-trying-to-contain-China-s-military-rise>

¹² <http://www.economist.com/node/21552212>

¹³ <http://www.economist.com/node/21552193>

It seems China's current strategy is to force America in to an arms race similar to the one it faced against the Soviet Union. Except this time it seems that it is the U.S.'s system that suffers from political dysfunction.¹⁴

China now has the 2nd largest naval service. It is developing missile technology capable of hitting moving targets at sea and has 66 submarines—twice that of the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. They expect to expand to 78 submarines by 2020 putting them at par with the U.S. in quantity if not quality.¹⁵ This naval expansion can allow China to retake Taiwan and potentially Okinawa (which they also see as stolen from Japan during the Qing Dynasty). Further, they can threaten Pacific island chains like Guam, the Philippines, and the Northern Mariana Islands with this advancement. Additionally, they are constructing six classes of modern surface warships and submarines simultaneously. And by 2020, they will surpass Russian technical shipbuilding proficiency.¹⁶

Foremost, this military advancement threatens the U.S.'s regional allies including Japan, Taiwan, and Korea. We can already see China's increase assertiveness towards all these nations.

In the case of Japan, China contests Japanese control over the Senkaku islands. And when a Chinese crew near the islands was detained by the Japanese, China cancelled diplomatic meetings with Tokyo and cut off export of rare earth materials to Japan. This case demonstrates China's increased aggressiveness towards Japan over a few islands.¹⁷ It has even sent aircrafts and naval vessels to the surrounding area.¹⁸

Moving on to Taiwan, after a U.S. arms sale package to Taiwan in 2008, China suspended joint U.S.-Chinese military exchanges and dialogues which was typical. But this time, China threatened to sanction U.S. companies that sold arms to Taiwan.¹⁹ Further, China has developed area-denial and anti-access weapons like attack submarines and anti-ship ballistic missiles to prevent the U.S. from defending Taiwan if it is attacked.

In regards to Korea, China announced opposition to joint naval exercises between South Korea and the U.S. Although China was made aware of the exact timing and location and the intention to intimidate North Korea after it sunk a South Korean submarine, they still opposed the

¹⁴ http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol12no04_0.pdf

¹⁵ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html>

¹⁶ <http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/01/u-s-navy-take-notice-china-is-becoming-a-world-class-military-shipbuilder/?all=true>

¹⁷ <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101026153543247305.html>

¹⁸ <http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/01/04/key-trends-to-watch-in-the-year-of-the-snake/>

¹⁹ http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_glaser_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf

exercises. Nor is China a serious partner in six party talks over denuclearizing North Korea. It shielded North Korea from sanctions in 2010 and is partially responsible for its development of nuclear weapons.²⁰

China's neighbors in the Pacific and Southeast Asia are also threatened by this increased military expansion. Most notably, China has deemed the South China Sea which borders nations like Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan to be a 'core interest' like its provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Essentially, China is declaring sovereign control of this waterway. It took argument with the U.S. calling it a maritime commons that should be free for all countries to navigate.²¹

Its nine dashes formula gives China sovereignty of over 80% of the South China Sea. It has confront Vietnam by cutting it seismic survey cables and sent law enforcement ships to confront Philippine navy vessels attempting to retrieve poached sharks from Chinese fishermen. Also, China has intimidated Exxon-Mobil and other multinational corporations for daring to assist surround nations with oil and gas exploration.

This is especially worrisome since a third of all commercial maritime traffic and half the hydrocarbons destined for Korea and Japan enter this sea. But this shows that China sees itself as a 19th century power carving out its own space of dominion in the Eastern Hemisphere as the U.S. did once in the Western Hemisphere. It also sets a slippery slope for surrounding seas like the East China Sea and the Yellow sea which too may be deemed 'core interest' that China believes it should rule over.

Although international law prohibits restricting of naval vessels in Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), China harassed U.S. surveillance ships in the China's EEZ in the South China Sea. In regards to territorial disputes, a Chinese diplomat declared, ""China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that's just a fact."²²

The U.S. interests are being threatened all across the world as China attempts to court Latin American, European, African, and other Asian nations with its investments. It is building ports in Burma, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. Though these are not naval bases, but they can still harbor Chinese warehouse goods and warships. Further, it is establishing a pipeline through

²⁰ <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0712/Five-tough-truths-about-U.S.-China-relations/China-and-the-U.S.-don-t-share-the-same-concerns-about-North-Korea-s-nuclear-program>

²¹ <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2010/10/20101026153543247305.html>

²² http://csis.org/files/publication/110613_glaser_CapacityResolve_Web.pdf

Afghanistan that will further spread its influence there.²³ China is acting like the USSR in its attempt to spread its tentacles across the world. America has responded to this increase assertiveness by opposing American military bases even though they only exist to counter China's aggression.²⁴

Further examples of Chinese belligerence include after the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the dissident, Liu Xiaobo, China suspended free trade talks with Norway and other diplomatic meetings with Norwegian officials. More glaringly, China also continues to invest in Iran despite sanctions on the part of the U.S. and the European Union.²⁵ Considering Iran is seen as a threat to American interests in the Middle East, China's funding only supports the theocratic regime there. It endangers peace and world stability.

From an economic perspective, one can take a protectionist standpoint to argue that American jobs are being outsourced to Chinese workers who are able to do them without high pay or safety regulations. This results in a loss of employment for American workers and the closure of American firms unable to compete with multinational corporations which have the capabilities to send jobs overseas.

Chinese ownership of U.S. debt also puts us in thrall to their economic interests. In the short-term, China is committed to ensuring U.S. growth. But over the long-term, China may move away from an export-oriented economy and may no longer need to rely on the U.S. Hence, it can use ownership of U.S. debt to influence and leverage U.S. foreign policy so it suits them. Essentially, China could re-establish the tributary system that it once held during the dynastic era over other East Asian nations.

And though Chinese imports may swarm the American market, export barriers still prevent American goods from entering the Chinese market. By not playing by the rules of free trade, China has caused America's trade deficit to balloon.²⁶

By practicing a 'good neighbor' policy in which it invests and trades with other Asian nations, it has also begun to cement economic ties with them. Although these investments improve these

²³ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/24/AR2010092404767.html>

²⁴ <http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/0712/Five-tough-truths-about-U.S.-China-relations/China-is-trying-to-supplant-the-U.S.-as-the-leading-military-and-political-power-in-Asia>

²⁵ <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01/10/282816/china-to-make-more-investments-in-iran/>

²⁶ http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1300/MR1300.ch10.pdf

neighbor economies, it also makes them dependent on China to advance.²⁷ This increased regional economic integration slowly drives the U.S. out and brings China closer. Although some of these nations are wary of China's advance, it becomes more difficult to protest China as economic interdependency grows.

As China grows, it will also need more natural resources like oil. The Christian Science Monitor furthers:

"Currently China consumes about six million barrels of oil a day, and the U.S. about 20 million. In 20 years, China will also need 20 million barrels of oil per day"²⁸

This increased need for oil will be in direct competition with the U.S. We can expect oil prices to rise even higher for American consumers taking ever larger portions of their paychecks. From an economic security standpoint, this endangers American consumption activities. This could result in more wars in the Middle East to ensure oil production continues. And more worryingly, China could take a more proactive stance in the Middle East so that it too could ensure oil flowed back to the East. Although it is very hypothetical, it could become another Cold War in the Middle East over the acquisition of oil.

Finally, China's neo-Leninist ideology poses a threat to U.S. interests abroad so long as it continues to suppress free speech and democracy. Dictator states can use China as a model for their continued human rights abuses rather than accepting the neoliberal economic order which promotes freedom.

As can be seen, there is a strong case that China is a growing military and economic threat to America's regional allies and eventually America itself. Chinese military spending, right now, is worrisome to Asian nations like Japan and the Philippines, but it will be even more troublesome when spending surpasses that of the U.S.'s. Any potential economic benefit matters little if China continues to maintain barriers against American exports and exclude America from trade agreements in East Asia. Overall, these pose serious threats to U.S. interests.

PRO debaters may claim that U.S.-China economic interdependence is too strong for China to be able to threaten US interests. It would be fruitful for CON debaters to provide the example of Germany's rise in the early 20th century. Germany was the 2nd largest trading partner for Great Britain, and pundits at the time prognosticated no war could come despite Germany's military

²⁷ http://csis.org/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol12no04_0.pdf

²⁸ <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0630/p01s01-usec.html>

buildup. Nevertheless, World War I erupted, and two great powers and trading partners engaged in a nasty war. Already China is cementing ties to nations like Iran that oppose the United States and creating alliances much like Germany did prior to World War I. Comparisons to Germany and the USSR will be useful in diminishing the arguments of the PRO side and provide further historical evidence that China's rise will be dangerous.

We should expect China's military spending to rise as its economy grows, but unlike other nations, their weapons are clearly directed at spreading China's influence in the region. This empowers them to bully American allies and endanger American interests. It would further be acceptable if the Chinese military and the U.S. military held dialogues or if the Chinese were more transparent in their military spending. But since they refrain from both, it can only be assumed that their intentions are far from benign.

Finally, remember weighing will be key. Cheap Chinese imported products are outweighed by the dangerous military spending China pursues. Cooperation on counter-proliferation or anti-piracy efforts are also outweighed by the offensive military spending that comes with this rise like ballistic missiles and attack submarines. All of the potential benefits are minor and do not significantly advance US interests especially when it comes at the high cost of diminishing influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Topic Analysis by Jessica Bailey

“China is a large country... inhabited by many Chinese.”

- Former French President Charles De Gaulle²⁹

De Gaulle’s accurate yet undeniably ignorant assessment of China is indicative of the way the country has befuddled Western leaders for centuries. It is one of the few communist countries to have emerged prosperous and growing from the Cold War, vastly overshadowing nearby North Korea and thriving as even Europe and the U.S. confronted economic recession. China is a nuclear-armed country and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and its ability to unilaterally veto any U.N. resolution has sometimes put it at odds with the U.S. China is now a global economic superpower, second only to the U.S. in size and strength.³⁰ On the one hand, its economic growth has provided the U.S. and Europe with a powerful and convenient trading partner. On the other hand, China’s growing prominence causes worry in many Western politicians, who fear it threatens U.S. interests with its increased power and presence in the world. During the 2012 Republican Presidential Nominee debates, for example, Texas Governor and then-candidate Rick Perry argued that “The communist Chinese government will end up on the ash heap of history if they do not change their virtues.”³¹

Like Perry, many American politicians fear the rise of China because China is so different from the U.S. Its state-run economy stand in stark contrast to the American moral vision of a capitalist free market, and the emphasis on community and collective well-being seems an affront to the American belief in individualism. Others are wary of China’s growing prominence for a much more basic reason - the more powerful other nations like China become, the less powerful the United States is by comparison. This latter view reflects the idea that power is “zero sum” - that power is comparative and one nation’s increase in power comes at the expense of all other nations, who are necessarily weaker.

29 Danahar, Paul. “India and China: A Race of Two Halves.” *BBC News*, August 16, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6947567.stm

30 Hosaka, Tomoko A. “China Surpasses Japan as World’s No. 2 Economy.” *Washington Post*, August 16, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081503697.html>

31 Goldberg, Michelle. “Republicans Show Stunning Ignorance of China in South Carolina Debate.” *The Daily Beast*, November 11, 2011. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/11/12/republicans-show-stunning-ignorance-of-china-in-south-carolina-debate.html>

Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell summarize the apparent rise of China and its perceived implications in a recent edition of *Foreign Affairs* magazine. They explain:

"Great power" is a vague term, but China deserves it by any measure: the extent and strategic location of its territory, the size and dynamism of its population, the value and growth rate of its economy, the massive size of its share of global trade, and the strength of its military. China has become one of a small number of countries that have significant national interests in every part of the world and that command the attention, whether willingly or grudgingly, of every other country and every international organization. And perhaps most important, China is the only country widely seen as a possible threat to U.S. predominance. Indeed, China's rise has led to fears that the country will soon overwhelm its neighbors and one day supplant the United States as a global hegemon."³²

Enter the resolution. As China continues to "rise," the question of how the United States should view its growing prominence is timelier than ever.

Unpacking the resolution:

On balance

The phrase "on balance" acknowledges the complicated nature of the relationship between the United States and China. It implies that in some ways, China's growing prominence is good for the U.S., and in some ways bad for it. This is the framers' way of making sure that we are talking about the impact of China's rise on U.S. interests in the aggregate - as a whole, for the most part, all things considered, etc. We can understand the resolution as saying, "for the most part," or "on the whole," the rise of China is good for the U.S. The job of the pro team will be to show that U.S. interests are, in the aggregate, better served by China's growing prominence.

Since the resolution presupposes that the rise of China will be good for the U.S. in some ways and bad in others, it is important for teams on both sides to offer some sort of weighing mechanism to compare costs and benefits. Some U.S. interests are more important than others, and harm to them may outweigh even great benefit to lesser concerns. It won't be enough to

32 Nathan, Andrew J. and Andrew Scobell. "How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing's Fears." *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2012.
<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138009/andrew-j-nathan-and-andrew-scobell/how-china-sees-america>

show all of the positive impacts of the rise of China without addressing how they outweigh the negative impacts, and vice versa. Even more than some other resolutions, this topic demands that teams make direct comparisons between the costs and benefits each side is claiming. In doing so, teams will need to:

- a. Consider how U.S. interests compare in relative importance - i.e. is national security generally more important than economic competitiveness?
- b. Consider the magnitude of costs and benefits - i.e. would we be willing to tolerate a small threat to national security in exchange for a sufficiently big economic benefit?

The rise of China

The framers of the resolution chose not to specify what aspects of China's rise - in terms of military power, economic might, political influence, or any other way. For decades, China has been gaining in each of these arenas, but some analysts believe that China's gains in these areas do not qualify it for "superpower" status. Economist Martin Jacques argues, "The only sense in which China is a superpower is economic - that is, its economy is already over half the size of the US economy and projected to overtake it around 2018, notwithstanding its reduced growth rate of 7%. But this is overwhelmingly a function of China's huge population. In terms of technology and living standards it lags far behind the US."³³

Jacques' contention that China is not ready to rival the U.S. in terms other than economic does not, however, imply that China is not on the rise in these regards. The U.S. military accounts for half of the entire global defense spending,³⁴ so the fact that China's military is less powerful and prominent than the U.S.'s is not a shock to anyone. Professor of International Affairs Scheherazade Rehman explains that one of the reasons China's "rise" seems so impressive and imminent is because, "Using almost any metric, the sheer numbers associated with China are overwhelming, be it the number for population, land mass, economic prowess, energy and food consumption, sovereign wealth funds, etc. The sheer size of these numbers are what convinces most people that China is going to rival the United States."³⁵

33 Jacques, Martin. "What Kind of Superpower Could China Be?" *BBC News*. October 19, 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-19995218>

34 Ibid.

35 Rehman, Scheherazade (Professor of International Finance/Business and International Affairs at George Washington University). "China's Enemy No. 1: Income Inequality." *U.S. News and World Report*, December 10, 2012. <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2012/12/10/china-must-address-inequality-to-be-a-global-superpower>

This begs the question - is China rising to *superpower* status? This will be for you to decide in your research. As you develop your positions, it may be helpful to keep this definition of “superpower” in mind:

A superpower stands on its own, without the need of allies (although those may be helpful at times). It influences other states, sometimes at a cost to these states' national interests. It possesses enormous reserves of strength, sufficient enough to carry it through the most severe trials of real combat or devastating diplomatic reversals. It steers events to serve its interests, by subtle, sometimes invisible means, even in distant places. It prevents others from harming its national interests, or altering its existing spheres of influence. Its culture is dominant, and it modifies other cultures. Finally, it constrains the behaviour of enemies. If talking fails, diplomacy is backed up by the threat to use overwhelming force.³⁶

Whether China is “rising” enough to challenge U.S. preeminence in the world, or just rising relative to its former position, it cannot be denied that China's economy has been growing while Europe's and the U.S.'s declined. Its growing economic power has enabled China to wield greater influence globally, and especially in Asia. This greater global influence has enabled it to resist U.S. pressure when their interests collide, sometimes putting the two powers at odds over issues like intervention in Syria or constraining North Korea.

Beneficial to the interests of the United States:

U.S. interests are broad. They encompass physical security, regional and global influence, trade, technological development, military might, and the protection of human rights. Some of these objectives are likely to be helped by the rise of China; others may suffer as a result.

Pro: The rise of China is good for U.S. interests

The clearest benefit China's rise has on U.S. interests is to our economy. China, as the world's second largest economy, is a tremendously important trading partner for the United States. Trade between the U.S. and China is estimated to be worth more than \$500 billion per year.³⁷ In

36 Velk, Tom and Olivia Gong. “China, the Subtle Superpower.” *South China Morning Post*. November 26, 2012. <http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1090627/china-subtle-superpower?page=all>

37 Ibid.

testimony before Congress, China expert Eswar Prasad explains, "Trade between the two economies has continued to increase in volume and the U.S. remains one of China's major export markets. Chinese exports to the U.S. rose from \$100 billion in 2000 to \$296 billion in 2009, while imports rose from \$16 billion to \$70 billion³⁸"

Some analysts also argue that China's government realizes that in order to preserve its high economic growth rate, it must continue its trend towards openness and liberalization. He Weiwen, co-director of the China - U.S./E.U. Study Center at the China Association of International Trade in Beijing recently stated, "The fundamental policy on international trade is adherence to opening and reform. It will certainly continue and develop to a new height, including China's trade policy on the U.S."³⁹ For example, China has been frequently chastised for currency manipulation. Over the past few years, China has responded to U.S. pressure over the value of its currency and allowed it to rise in value.⁴⁰ The pro team can remind judges that although China may be on the rise, it is not growing in isolation of international norms and pressures. Because China's economy is so irrevocably intertwined with ours, it is not possible for China to ignore pressures from the United States.

As Governor Perry's comments during the 2012 Presidential primaries indicate, there is substantial fear among U.S. politicians over China's rise in large part because it is a communist nation. Since before the Cold War, the U.S. has viewed communism as the antithesis of the American way of life and an affront to the values we stand for. Thus in some ways, the rise of China has represented an existential, moral threat to some politicians in the U.S. However, China's growing economic presence has only been possible because the Chinese government has relaxed many restrictions on individual freedoms - such as property ownership. Even the *CIA World Factbook* recognizes China's increasing liberalization:

Since the late 1970s China has moved from a closed, centrally planned system to a more market-oriented one that plays a major global role - in 2010 China became the world's largest exporter. Reforms began with the phasing out of collectivized agriculture, and expanded to include the gradual liberalization of prices, fiscal

38 Prasad, Eswar (Testimony to the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review Commission). "The U.S. - China Economic Relationship: Shifts and Twists in the Balance of Power." *The Brookings Institution*, February 25, 2010.

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2010/02/25-us-china-debt-prasad>

39 Bradsher, Keith. "Change in Negotiators Shakes Up U.S.-China Trade Policy." *The New York Times*. November 18, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/19/business/global/both-us-and-china-will-appoint-new-trade-negotiators.html?_r=0

40 Isidore, Chris. "Japan Owns Almost as Much U.S. Debt as China." *CNN Money*, October 22 2012. <http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/22/investing/china-japan-treasuries/index.html>

decentralization, increased autonomy for state enterprises, creation of a diversified banking system, development of stock markets, rapid growth of the private sector, and opening to foreign trade and investment. China has implemented reforms in a gradualist fashion.⁴¹

This shift towards a more open economy is good for U.S. interests in a number of ways. First and foremost, it makes free and open trade with China, which is currently the world's largest exporter of goods, easier and more balanced. Additionally, insofar as U.S. interests include promoting democracy and individual rights globally, China's move towards liberalization, however gradual it may be, is in line with those interests.

Another potential pro argument is that China's rise and corresponding increase in global influence are good for the U.S. because it relieves our burden of being the world's police force. In the con section we will examine the argument that such influence could be bad for the U.S. because it allows China to shape the actions of other nations in ways that could undermine U.S. interests. In this section we will focus instead on the positive side of this development.

China has chosen to invest in parts of Africa, for example, that the U.S. has decided not to engage as heavily in, at least for the time being. Assistant President of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations Fu Mengzi⁴² explains: "The Khartoum oil plant, co-sponsored by China and Sudan, is a good example of such a joint program. Sudan is rich in oil resources, but in the past it could not produce enough to satisfy even its domestic needs. Thanks to China's help, it now produces enough oil not only to meet its needs, but also to export."⁴³ Supporters of China's growing influence in conflict-ridden places like Sudan and the new offshoot nation South Sudan, where ethnic and religious tensions between Christians and Muslims have made peace difficult, argue that it is far more desirable to have China exerting influence in the region than groups with ties to religious extremists or terrorist networks.

Proponents of the "zero sum" concept of power would argue that China's growing influence in places like Africa necessarily implies diminishing influence for the United States. The pro could

41 "China." *CIA World Factbook*. Updated January 3, 2013.

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>

42 Note that in Chinese and many other East Asian cultures, a person's surname comes before their personal name. Thus "Mengzi" is what we in the states would call Mr. Fu's "first name." Keep this in mind as you cite authors and refer to Chinese leaders during this topic.

43 Fu Mengzi (assistant president of and a research professor with the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations). "The Global Influence of China. *China Daily*, February 22, 2011. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-02/22/content_12054406.htm

argue that such a world view ignores shifting trends in power relations and is too much based in Cold War ideology that no longer holds for our modern world. Fu continues:

China has learned much from other countries' experiences, but it has made innovations, too. The history of the past few centuries shows, and as many realists have observed, a rising country has almost always challenged the reigning power and its hegemony. But China advocates and believes in a harmonious world and has strictly observed the principle of peace in its development. This is a new, peaceful chapter in the history of rising powers. Peace and cooperation are two words that best describe China's rise. As an emerging power, it has shown no intention of challenging the existing order. It has cooperated with other countries, irrespective of its relations with them, in pursuing common interests. In its joint programs with other countries, China has always tried to find a path that would benefit both sides instead of gaining profit only for itself.⁴⁴

It is important for the pro team to argue that the rise of China does not mean decline of the U.S. As Rehman states, "Let me reiterate that any discussion of a rising new superpower does not imply that the United States will lose its hegemony; it simply means that the United States will have a *"balancer"* or an *"equalizer"* next to it."⁴⁵

Nor does the rise of China imply that it will use its influence in a neocolonialist manner, infringing on the interests and sovereignty of less powerful nations. Jacques writes:

The West and China share an important characteristic - they both believe they are universal, a model for all others. But the way they have interpreted this in practice has been entirely different. For Europe, and latterly the US, it meant projecting their power around the world, most spectacularly during the heyday of colonialism in the 19th and first half of the 20th Century, when a large part of the world found itself under European rule. China won't be like this. It is not in its DNA. Its rulers will be far less interested in seeking to dominate the rest of the world and far more concerned with keeping themselves in power. That is what ruling a country containing a fifth of the world's population obliges.⁴⁶

44 Ibid.

45 Rehman, previously cited.

46 Jacques, previously cited.

The pro should point out that it is a fallacy to assume that China's ascension in the international arena will mirror the ascension of Western powers before it. The culture, history and goals of China are arguably very different from those of the U.S. and Europe, and as such its "rise" will have a different trajectory and impact.

Con: The rise of China undermines U.S. interests

Despite the many economic advantages of a growing and prosperous China, its rise does bring some potential downsides for the U.S. For example, for many years China was a middle-level manufacturing country. It produced relatively low-tech and inexpensive goods, which the U.S. and other countries readily bought up. As it has become more advanced, China's manufacturing sector now competes with our own on the global stage.

Chinese industries are moving up the value chain faster than many US competitors expected. Thus, Chinese firms are beginning to compete (or show the potential to compete) globally in areas that touch core American comparative advantages, such as advanced electronics or aircraft manufacture.⁴⁷

As U.S. manufacturing continues to decline, China's sector has been growing and developing. The pro team could respond, however, that this problem has more to do with the U.S. failing to keep up with changing manufacturing demands than China's rise. The solution is to promote higher skilled manufacturing in the U.S., not oppose China's growing manufacturing might.

Many American analysts fear that the rise of China will be bad for U.S. innovation and business in another way. The U.S. has long accused China of violating intellectual property rights and essentially stealing U.S. technological innovation. On its opinion page, the Editorial staff of the *New York Times* argued that,

"stringent protection of foreigners' intellectual property is at odds with China's development strategy. Foreign companies operating in China complain that Beijing views the appropriation of foreign innovations as part of a policy mix aimed at developing domestic technology. This type of intellectual property theft is increasingly common, according to American companies operating in China. In fact, they say, it is tacitly supported by Beijing, and includes forcing foreigners to disclose their technology in order

47 Paulson, Henry M. Jr. (Chairman, The Paulson Institute. Former Secretary of the Treasury, 2006 - 2009 (under George W. Bush)). "A New Framework for U.S. - China Economic Relations." *Atlantic Council*. July, 2012.
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/Paulson_0.pdf

to gain contracts. China's new antimonopoly laws would allow compulsory licensing of foreign technologies in some cases and require foreign companies that wanted to merge with or buy a Chinese company to transfer technology to China. Several foreign companies have found themselves competing against Chinese firms using a slight variation of the foreign technology.⁴⁸

The pro team could respond that such fears are overblown, however, and that there are many ways to protect intellectual property while still working closely with China. China expert Jack Perkowski explains in *Forbes*:

My answer to companies puzzling over this issue has several aspects. Before addressing the broader issues, I point out that there are a variety of ways to protect technology in China. None, of course, are foolproof, but taking certain precautions can substantially lessen the risk. For example, setting up a wholly owned foreign company where possible to manufacture the product, rather than entering into a joint venture, provides more control over who has access to the technology and know-how. Breaking the manufacturing process into several discrete operations that are located in different facilities can prevent any single group of employees from seeing the whole process. Another good way to prevent technology leakage is to manufacture more components, where much of the technology is contained, in-house, rather than outsourcing.⁴⁹

Another way in which China's rise could threaten U.S. interests is by giving it enough economic clout to coerce the U.S. and other countries to act in ways beneficial to China. For example, China recently restricted trade of rare earth minerals - crucial in the manufacture of high technology such as cell phones - to Japan in retaliation for the arrest of a Chinese sea captain. The Center for International and Strategic Studies summarizes the incident:

A more widely reported case of China using trade as a weapon to force a country to alter its policy occurred in September 2010 when Beijing blocked shipments of rare earth minerals to Japan. The action was taken in retaliation for Japan's detention of the captain of a Chinese fishing trawler in an incident near the Senkaku Islands, which are under Japanese control but are also claimed by China

48 Editorial Staff. "China and Intellectual Property." *The New York Times*, December 23, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/24/opinion/24fri1.html?_r=0

49 Perkowski, Jack. "Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in China." *Forbes*, April 18, 2012. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jackperkowski/2012/04/18/protecting-intellectual-property-rights-in-china/>

and Taiwan... Beijing's action alarmed Tokyo and was a major factor in the decision of the Japanese government to release the captain. The embargo was viewed by many experts as evidence of Chinese willingness to use economic leverage to have its way in an international dispute.⁵⁰

China's rise means that it now has clout in ways less prominent nations do not. There are very few countries whose trade and economy are so important to our own that they could feasibly influence U.S. policy; China is one of few such countries.

In the Pro section, I explained the argument that China's growing influence in the world is not necessarily identical to previous global powers, and can't be assumed to be accompanied by the same problems. Specifically, I cited authors who maintain that China's approach to influencing other countries does not have the same neocolonial characteristics that global powers in the West had. There is not, however, universal agreement on this point. Bonnie Glaser explains,

"In Africa, China is already pushing out former colonial powers like France and Britain --but also the U.S.-- from many sectors and offering no strings attached aid to African countries in a form of soft neo-imperialism that is very effective. What decliners who believe in American exceptionalism do not factor in is that decline may also come from the rise of others as well as from domestic decline. American institutions may be better than Chinese ones but in global competition this does not count for much."⁵¹

Moreover, China's growing influence throughout the world may be at odds with U.S. interests. Velk and Gong explain: "While America's profligate expenditure of blood and treasure in the Middle East may end in profitless withdrawal, China, by subtle and nuanced deals with Iran and Syria, has gained access to needed oil supplies. While the US contemplates new military intervention, Syria's sales to China provide financial lifeblood, giving China significant leverage."⁵² While it might be helpful for U.S. interests to have China exert benign influence in places like Sudan and South Sudan, that influence may run counter to U.S. interests in other regions, such as Syria or North Korea.

50 Glaser, Bonnie S. "China's Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend." *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. August 6, 2012. <http://csis.org/publication/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend>

51 Guerlain, Pierre (American Civilization Professor at Nanterre University). "American Decline: The US Shoots Itself in the Foot." *The Huffington Post*, January 15, 2013. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pierre-guerlain/american-decline-denial_b_2481036.html?utm_hp_ref=politics&ir=Politics

52 Velk and Gong, previously cited.

While some analysts see China opening its economy to more liberal policies, others see a continuation of the same state controlled economy that runs contrary to the American ideal of a capitalist free market. For such analysts, the economic rise of China is accompanied by growing military power - not aimed at exerting influence on the outside world, necessarily, but more designed to preserve the balance of power within China. They see such developments as a threat to U.S. interests in promoting democracy and human rights abroad, as well as a potential risk to U.S. economic interests. Former Senator Fritz Hollings argues:

As the United States puffs and blows around the world like a military superpower, China quietly but vigorously develops its economy. China is our principal competition in foreign policy. We not only ignore China's competition but support it by offshoring our research, innovation, technology, production, jobs, payrolls -- our economy to China. China aims to become the world's economic superpower. When China moves to prosper its remaining 700 million people, it will thank the U.S., bid it goodbye and Corporate America will return home and have nothing to produce. We think we are developing freedom and democracy in China. China's leaders know that they will have to keep control of their economy and vast population or the country will come apart. China develops a strong military, not just to defend China but, to defend the Central Committee. The Central Committee uses the military to keep law and order as its people gain more rights and freedom.⁵³

It should be noted that such sentiments are more the exception than the norm. By and large, U.S. politicians acknowledge that China's growing power and economy could threaten the U.S. in some ways, but are more inclined to see it as a strategic partner than a potential enemy. As you conduct your research, keep in mind the political leanings of your sources on both sides.

China's growing economic power, and its imbalanced trade relationship with the U.S., have enabled China to invest heavily in U.S. debt by purchasing U.S. treasuries. China ownership of U.S. Treasury bonds reached \$1.15 trillion in August 2012. This number was actually down from a high the previous August, but China's holdings of U.S. Treasuries continue to concern many American analysts. But just what does it mean to say that China "owns" U.S. debt? The answer is somewhat complicated. Basically, the government sells Treasury notes, or bonds, to finance its

⁵³ Hollings, Fritz (Former Senator, South Carolina). "The Arrogance of Power." *The Huffington Post*, December 28, 2012. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-ernest-frederick-hollings/the-arrogance-of-power_b_2377112.html

debt. The bonds have a “term,” a number of years over which they generate interest. When a bond holder cashes out the bond, they get the initial value of the bond plus whatever interest it has generated. Interest rates tend to be low because the risk of buying government bonds is also very low - they are guaranteed by the U.S. government, which is partially why they are so attractive to foreign governments and other investors.⁵⁴

China’s stake in the U.S. debt could threaten U.S interests. Charles Freeman III and Wen Jin Yuan argue in a briefing by the Center for Strategic and International Affairs:

The past decade has seen an unprecedented boom in Chinese investment flows to the United States. China has been using its massive dollar reserves to purchase U.S. Treasury bills and it is now the largest foreign holder of Treasury securities. With the growing amount of Chinese investment inflows, there is an increasing concern among some in the United States, that China’s investment in the United States is a strategic endeavor of the Chinese government, and one not made based on solely commercial merits, but rather as part of a larger government policy to secure access to natural resources and core technology for China’s rapidly growing economy. The subsequent conclusion is that the security of U.S. strategic assets and technology may be threatened by China’s government-controlled investment.⁵⁵

Conclusion

This timely and interesting resolution provides debaters with a great potential for innovative, unusual, and/or data-based arguments. This brief covers some of the most common arguments for and against the resolution, but as with all real-world topics, there are many others that the scope of this brief does not permit us to analyze in detail. As you conduct your research on this topic, as always, pay attention to the timeliness of your evidence. Especially when citing evidence about the U.S.'s recent economic recession and recovery, or specific policies between the U.S. and China, be sure the data you cite is current.

⁵⁴ Amadeo, Kimberly. “What are Treasury Bills, Notes and Bonds?” *About.com*.
http://useconomy.about.com/od/bondsfaq/f/Treasury_Bonds.htm

⁵⁵ Freeman, Charles W. III and Wen Jin Yuan. “China’s Investment in the United States.”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 2011.
http://csis.org/files/publication/111107_Freeman_Briefing_China_Investment_in_US.pdf

Finally, it is easy to forget that the essential question the resolution poses cuts both ways: just how the U.S. responds to the rise of China will determine whether the U.S. - China relationship is beneficial for China's interests, as well. Nathan and Scobell explain, "managing the fraught U.S.-Chinese relationship is Beijing's foremost foreign policy challenge. And just as Americans wonder whether China's rise is good for U.S. interests or represents a looming threat, Chinese policymakers puzzle over whether the United States intends to use its power to help or hurt China."⁵⁶

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Nathan and Scobell, previously cited.

Topic Analysis by Dan Miyamoto

The current apparent rise of China comes after what some Chinese call a “century of humiliation” at the hands of foreign powers. Wariness, on the part of China, of foreign powers is generally traced back to the 19th century when European colonial powers foisted on China a host of so-called “unequal treaties”. China's “humiliation” at the hands of foreigners continued into the first half of the 20th century with invasion and occupation by imperial Japan.

China's previous stagnation was partly self-inflicted as well. Disastrous policies by Communists lead to famine and the death of millions in the 1960s. It was only in the 1970s, with the emergence of a new leadership more accepting of markets and less concerned with communist orthodoxy, that the current Chinese economic miracle emerged. In 1978, when Deng Xiaopeng rose to power and began market reforms, mainland China economy was only 1/20th the size of the United States'. By the end of the millennium, it had closed the gap to be around one quarter the size of the US economy and is expected to surpass the United States in the coming decades.⁵⁷

Such quick economic growth has not been without majors costs however. Most notable are the environmental costs. A result of weak regulations and enforcement, pollution from China's industries has deadly consequences for its citizens. Hundreds of thousands die each year from poor air quality and cancer is now the leading cause of death. In the course of its development, China too has already become the number one emitter of greenhouse gases. As part of an attempt to better adjust economic policy to account for environmental costs, a pilot program incorporating the costs from pollution was abandoned after pollution-adjusted growth rates were near zero for some provinces. Such environmental degradation has consequences beyond China's border with air pollution blowing across borders affecting China's neighbors and undermining global efforts to reign in the emission of greenhouse gases.⁵⁸

This astonishing growth rate on the part of China is largely driven by exports with huge trade surpluses used to finance domestic investments. Yet, this export-driven growth has brought about tension with the United States, for a trade surplus for China is a trade deficit for the US. American

⁵⁷ Jacques, Martin. “Why do we continue to ignore China's rise? Arrogance”, The Observer, Mar 24, 2012.

⁵⁸ Kahn, Joseph; Yardley, Jim; “As China Roars, Pollution Reaches Deadly Extremes”, NY Times, Aug 26, 2007.

politicians blame the disappearance of American jobs on unfair practices such as currency manipulation which keeps the price of Chinese goods artificially low.⁵⁹

Yet despite its vastness, such deficits cannot continue forever and many agree that China needs to rebalance its economy away from an export-driven one. Such a transition to a consumption driven growth model augurs a wider market for American exports.⁶⁰ Furthermore, increasing wages among Chinese workers, and hence labor costs, will reduce China competitive advantage as the middle kingdom continues to rise, narrow the US trade deficit, and aid China's transition to a consumer economy.

However, one import consequence of past and continuing trade deficits with China is the accumulation of American debt by China. Although recently overtaken slightly by Japan as the largest holder of US debt, China had long held that distinction. While some Chinese officials have suggested the possibility of selling off this debt to destabilize the American economy and punish the US for selling arms to Taiwan, the interdependence of the US and China makes this unlikely as using its holdings of US debt as a bargaining chip would "have limited effect and likely would do more harm to China than to the United States."⁶¹ Indeed, to keep the value of its currency low and the price of its exports competitive, China has little choice but to continue to buy US debt.

Furthermore, the purchase of American debt by China is not without its benefits to the United States. These purchases have, in a time of record budget deficits, kept interest rates low and permitted for the financing of economic recovery efforts, defense spending, and all manner of government projects.⁶² However, whether or not enabling reliance on deficit spending is beneficial in the long run remains debatable.

China's economic ascent has brought with it a geopolitical rise as well. While still a relatively poor country when considering the size of its population, its newfound wealth has nevertheless provided China with the means to greatly modernize its military. China has recently put to sea its first aircraft carrier, purchased from Russia, and intended as an instrument of power projection in the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, China has fielded its own indigenously developed fighter jets and satellites and launched its own manned space flight program.

⁵⁹ Censky, Annalyn. "What is currency manipulation, anyhow?", CNNMoney, Nov 11, 2010

⁶⁰ Porter, Eduardo. "Better Ways to Deal With China", New York Times, Oct 23, 2012.

⁶¹ Morrison, Wayn; Labonte, Marc; "China's Holdings of US Securities", Federation of American Scientists, Dec 6, 2012.

⁶² Krugman, Paul. "Capital Export, Elasticity Pessimism, and the Renminbi. New York Times, Mar 16, 2010.

Indeed, China's rise and growing power promises to usher in a new era of multi-polarity, which multiple powers exercise global leadership, replacing American unipolar leadership. Indeed:

China's insistence on a "multi-polar world" and its obvious challenge to the US is stated unambiguously in a 2002 Defense White Paper, which identified US efforts to strengthen military alliances in Asia as one of the "factors of instability" in the region.⁶³

Consequently, there is no guarantee that a transition to a multipolar world would be peaceful. Like Germany during the first half of the 20th century, some consider China to be a revisionist power seeking to challenge the established international order and establish for itself a "place in the sun", and consequently, like Germany, they see China's rise as a threat to the existing balance of power and world peace. Indeed, conflict with China is not unthinkable with at least two plausible scenarios for war.

First, Taiwan, which China considers, a rogue province, has a security pact with the United States that obliges the US to come to Taiwan's aid if attacked. Likewise, China's Anti-Secession Law demands the use of force against Taiwan should it attempt to declare its independence. Should Taiwan declare or seem to be moving towards declaring independence, conflict would undoubtedly result, drawing in the United States. Whether or not a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be successful is disputable, however, even without a successful invasion, China has the military capacity to punish the US for any intervention or interference in the Taiwan issue.

Secondly, there are ongoing maritime disputes between China and many of its neighbors. Most notable is the dispute with Japan over a group of islands, with both powers sending air and sea patrols to the islands in dangerous proximity of one another. Of greater concern though, the right-wing governor of Tokyo has cited the dispute with China specifically as a reason to develop nuclear weapons stating, "If Japan had had nuclear (weapons), there would not have been any (Chinese encroachment) on the Senkakus."⁶⁴ Even prominent members of the current ruling party in Japan have in the past, called for the need to debate the prospect of Japan developing nuclear weapons.⁶⁵ Such a decision would not be beyond the technical means of Japan and would likely have far-reaching implications for regional affairs and global non-proliferation efforts.

⁶³ Caroll, William, "China in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Hegemony, Multi-Polar Balance, or Cooperation in Central Asia, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Dec 2011.

⁶⁴ Ryall, Julian, "Japan 'should develop nuclear weapons to defend itself'", The Telegraph, Feb 4, 2011.

⁶⁵ Masaki, Hisane. "Japanese nukes: Voicing the unthinkable", AsiaTimes, Nov 16, 2006.

Maritime conflicts between China and other Southeast Asian nations also threaten to be an obstacle to freedom of navigation on the seas. Island chains and maritime territory claimed by China in the South China Sea lie very close the Straits of Malacca, one of the world's most important shipping lanes and China's main avenue of shipping. Disputes over this territory threaten to hinder trade as, in an effort to bolster its claims, China. Resolving disputes over this area will prove difficult as it's considered "a fundamental issue of national sovereignty on par with Tibet or Taiwan".⁶⁶

Yet, the likelihood of military conflict is again tempered by the mutual economic dependence of the US and China. Any conflict would have disastrous impacts on trade, the Chinese economy, and hence domestic stability, making direct military confrontation an unappealing option.⁶⁷ However, this does not discount the fact that a minor incident, perhaps arising from a maritime dispute, may still escalate into a broader conflict.

Increased assertiveness or aggression by China on the regional and global stages might too solidify ties between the US and other countries. Concerns over China's military buildup have already reenergized military alliances with Japan and South Korea. Even Malaysia and Vietnam, not traditionally supportive of American interests, have sought closer ties with the US in response to China's rise.⁶⁸

Even short of war, however, China's increased international clout has major implications for the United States and its interests. As China becomes more influential, it has felt more confident in challenging US leadership and views on a number of issues such as UN resolutions on Libya and Syria, undermining American interests in those countries.

Furthermore, the pillars of American global leadership are the international institutions and frameworks through which the United States exercises its power. While a transition to a multi-polar world may mean less direct influence for the US, the international order will still likely be comprised by US-led institutions. A peaceful rise by China then demands that efforts be made to integrate China into these institutions. For, while the rise of China to a global power portends waning influence on the part of the United States,

⁶⁶ Bigg, Matthew. "ASEAN chief voices alarm at China plan to board ships in disputed waters", Reuters, Nov 30, 2012.

⁶⁷ Holmes, James. "Mutual Dependence and War", The Diplomat, Nov 4, 2011.

⁶⁸ Solomon, Jay; Hayashi, Yuka; Dean, Jason, "As China Swaggers, Neighbors Embrace U.S.", Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2010.

[T]hat does not necessarily mean a violent power struggle or the overthrow of the Western system. The US-led international order can remain dominant even while integrating a more powerful China – but only if Washington sets about strengthening that liberal order now.⁶⁹

This liberal order is at the heart of US interests. Since the end of the Cold War and the apparent triumph of liberalism over socialism, it has been accepted that the “correct” model for growth and development is the liberal Western one which demands democracy, free markets, and competition. In light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many expected a similar liberal revolution in China, though such hopes were delayed if not dashed, by the violent crackdown on student protesters centered on Tiananmen Square in 1989. However, the emergence of China as a global power has occurred despite not adhering to such a path.

The continued growth of China could make the Chinese model of development a more attractive path than the American liberal model among developing economies. Such a turn of events, would certainly undermine American soft power and moral clout with the developing world, undermining US leadership and hegemony. An example of this phenomenon is Africa, whose largest trading partner is China. In Nigeria, the Senate president has called the Chinese mode of development “a good model for Nigeria in its quest for an authentic and stable development ideology.”⁷⁰ Elsewhere in the developing world, President Evo Morales of Bolivia has called China a “political, ideological, and programmatic ally of the Bolivian people.”⁷¹

The success of Chinese engagement with the rest of the developing world lay in the fact that, in contrast to the US and other Western powers, it does not make foreign assistance, investment, and trade conditional on domestic political reforms. Such conditionality has traditionally been the main tool of the US for the promotion of liberalism abroad and as a result the lack of Chinese insistence on similar “good governance” conditions can only undermine American efforts aimed at the promotion of democracy abroad.⁷²

Indeed, the emergence of an illiberal alternative to the American model would hinder efforts to promote human rights abroad, as the establishment of freedom, political rights, and the rule of law is not high on the Chinese leadership’s list of priorities. Women in violation of the one-child rule are still subjected to sanctions, fines, and forced abortions. Ethnic minorities are subject to

⁶⁹ Ikenberry, G. John, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West”, *Foreign Affairs*, Jan/Feb 2008.

⁷⁰ Barma, Naaznee; Ratner, Ely; “China’s Illiberal Challenge”, *Democracy*, Fall 2006.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Barma, Naaznee; Ratner, Ely; “China’s Illiberal Challenge”, *Democracy*, Fall 2006.

strict regulations on religious and cultural expressions and subject to politically motivated arrests.⁷³ Freedom of religion is non-existent with worship only allowed by state-approved religious organizations.⁷⁴ Censorship remains the rule with the so-called “Great Firewall of China” blocking certain websites and filtering out politically taboo topics. Critics of the party and the government are placed under indefinite house arrest with no legal recourse. Indeed, corrupt police and local officials constantly deny citizens the benefits of the rule of law. The rights of workers are almost non-existent. In short, the status of human rights in China is deplorable.⁷⁵

Still, despite this gulf between the US and China, the interests of both are convergent in a number of areas. Piracy and freedom of navigation is one example with Chinese naval forces engaging in anti-piracy operations alongside American forces off the Horn of Africa.⁷⁶ Furthermore, China has been viewed as cooperative on other global efforts such as non-proliferation efforts with regard to Iran and has been a major participant of the Six Party Talks over North Korea. Indeed, as the closest ally and patron of the North Korean state, China has a great deal of sway and can continue to play a major role in easing tensions on the peninsula.

Yet, lest optimism be overstated, China has thus far been far from the good global citizen. Industrial espionage, facilitated by the Chinese state, is undermining the competitiveness of foreign firms:

China is placing requirements on firms operating in China that are designed to force them to expose ‘their security measures or even their intellectual property to Chinese competitors’ as the price of doing business in China⁷⁷

German counter-intelligence estimated the costs to Germany from Chinese industrial espionage and cyber-attacks to be around 50 billion euros and reports China is capable of “sabotaging whole chunks of infrastructure” such as the power grid.⁷⁸

Moreover, the resolution posits China's rise as a given, and while most commentators treat it as a fact, it remains arguable that China's alleged ascendancy is illusory. Consequently, demonstrating China's rise to be temporary or fictional would prove the resolution false by challenging its assumption and there are several reasons to consider

⁷³ Human Rights Watch “World Report 2012: China”

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Etzioni, Amitai, “Is China a responsible stakeholder?”, International Affairs, 2011.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Connolly, Kate, “Germany accuses China of industrial espionage”, Jul 22, 2009.

The meteoric growth rates reported by the Chinese state are considered highly suspect with even top Communist officials admitting privately that GDP numbers exist “for reference only”.⁷⁹ Instead, many foreign investors use electricity use as a proxy to measure economic activity and those numbers point to a slowing Chinese economy.⁸⁰

While the slowing Chinese economy is acknowledged by many, debate rages on whether or not China can expect a “hard” or a “soft” landing, and there is no consensus on which to expect. A “hard landing”, however, would threaten to sharply blunt China's rise and threaten a delicate social stability built on the promise of economic growth. There is a general consensus that China needs to maintain a growth rate of around 8% just to prevent “massive political uprising”.⁸¹ Already, even with moderate growth levels, reports of “mass incidents” and social unrest have increased markedly.⁸²

Chinese real estate bubble. One hedge fund manager who predicted the collapse of Enron, sees a major bubble in Chinese real estate prices, calculating there is enough office space to give every man, woman, and child in China a cubicle.⁸³ Likewise, overbuilding has left behind housing and commercial developments that remain unoccupied. Such a bubble threatens China's growth prospects, like America's mortgage crisis but on a far greater scale. Indeed, 60% of China's economy is fixed-asset investment of which around a quarter is in new real estate investment, an unsustainable level even in the developed world.⁸⁴

Indeed, while much is made of the debt crisis in America, it pales in comparison to China's own debt levels. Huge amounts of debt are borne by local authorities. Increasing pressure from the debt forces local authorities to increase land seizures in order to service this debt, further spurring social unrest and upheaval.⁸⁵

Chinese weak currency policy and latent debt crisis also threatens its economy with accelerating inflation. Rising food prices in China could have a similar impact as in Egypt. Food inflation is

⁷⁹ Roberts, Dexter. “China Struggles to Publish Accurate Economic Data”, Bloomberg Businessweek, Jul 12, 2012.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ettinger, John, “Chinese Surplus Reversal: A Bitter Pill”, Yale Review of International Studies, Apr 2011.

⁸² Ren, Justine Zheng, “‘Mass incidents’ in China”, East Asia Forum, Jul 13, 2011.

⁸³ Olster, Scott. ‘Chanos vs. China’, CNNMoney, Nov 17, 2010.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Fung, Esther; Orlik, Tom; “China Tackles Land Grabs, Key Source of Rural Anger”, Wall Street Journal, Dec 5, 2012.

already evident, with rising feed prices driving up pork prices, a staple meat of the country.⁸⁶ This has potentially drastic consequences in a country where millions have died as a result of famines in living memory. Indeed:

Sensitivity to inflation runs deep in China -- a reminder of how poor the country remains, with the price of pork, for instance, remaining a major consideration in household finances. Chinese political movements, including the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, often have had their origins in inflation.⁸⁷

Such fundamental structural weakness of the Chinese economy begs the question whether or not China's rise is inevitable or even sustainable. One fact remains clear however: China's relative ascent to a regional and global powers promises to be a challenge to the United States and the US-led international order. Whether or not, China can be successfully integrated into this order remains to be seen and depends largely on the foreign policy tack that the US takes with regards to this potential rival.

⁸⁶ Thurkal, Naveen. "China Frets Over Coming Pork Shortage", New York Times, Aug 28, 2012.

⁸⁷ Areddy, James. "China Hits Brakes on Economic Stimulus", Wall Street Journal, Jan 13, 2010.

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Topic Analysis by Adam Torson

As the War in Afghanistan winds down, U.S. policymakers are poised to “pivot” their attention to East Asia and the Rise of China. In the decade plus since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, public attention has been trained primarily on the Global War on Terrorism, the Iraq War, and the related military endeavors in Afghanistan and Northwest Pakistan. As the U.S. draws down its position in these areas, however, international relations theorists are once again free to focus on a traditional preoccupation: great power politics and the fight for regional and global hegemony. This topic will challenge you to imagine U.S. foreign policy on both a regional and global level, and think through how the system of global governance evolves over time. The literature base is substantial and relatively easy to access, so jump in and enjoy!

Interpretation

A. On Balance

There are obviously both good and bad consequences to a complex phenomenon like the Rise of China. In debate we are often asked to assess the relative importance of these consequences to determine whether the net impact is positive or negative. The practical take-away is that weighing is the crux of this topic. It is not enough to simply list advantages or list disadvantages to China’s growing power; debaters must make arguments for the relative significance of these consequences when compared to one another. So, plan out your weighing arguments! Your preparation is not complete until you do.

B. The Rise of China

The Rise of China is a term of art in International Relations. It refers to several different types of growth and development in China. First, China’s population is already the largest in the world (over 1.3 Billion people), and its growing rapidly. This creates both challenges and opportunities; a large population creates tremendous capacity for economic and military production, but the tremendous challenge of providing for the socioeconomic wellbeing of all those people.

Second, China has experienced dramatic economic growth since it began to implement economic liberalization in the 1970s. While it’s GDP is still half that of the United States, China’s rate of economic growth has been astoundingly high over the last twenty years in particular. While this rate of growth is likely to slow to some extent, China’s enormous population gives it the potential to be more of an economic powerhouse than it already is.

Third, China's military strength is growing both in size and technological prowess. While it has traditionally been a forceful presence in East Asia, China is expanding the scope of its military capabilities. Whether and to what extent this can counter U.S. force projection in East Asia is an open question, and the United States still spends far more on its military than any other nation, but in the long term this might not always be the case.

This raises a series of interesting challenges. First, will China use its newfound status to take on responsibilities for global governance? For example, will it cooperate with other nations in orchestrating the anti-weapons-proliferation regime, on global climate change, or in protecting human rights? Second, will China's increasing power spark a rivalry for global hegemony with the United States? Will the loss of relative power spark hostile relations between the U.S. and China? Finally, how will China's expanded capabilities affect the power dynamics of East Asia? China's historically hostile relations with many of its neighbors and ongoing conflicts about maritime and territorial claims all make China's emergence as a superpower an extremely consequential turn of events for the region. Will China be content with the status quo or will it seek to leverage its newfound power to make territorial and political gains?

In addition to considering near-term implications of China's Rise, international relations theorists are very interested in looking at long term evolution of power dynamics. In 75 years, will China be the world's predominant superpower and the United States a secondary power? Will the liberal world order persist or will China's rise mean a fundamental upheaval for global culture and norms? The answers to these questions are highly speculative but nonetheless interesting to think about.

C. Beneficial to the Interests of the United States

This phrase is very awkwardly worded, but the essential point comes through. Are U.S. interests likely to be helped or harmed by the Rise of China? The term "U.S. Interests" is incredibly expansive, but thinking through those that China might affect is critical to understanding the resolution.

1. Interests in East Asia

The United States has a number of strategic interests in East Asia, all of which are closely connected to the Rise of China. Perhaps most importantly, the U.S. has a strong interest in

maintaining a stable nuclear deterrent with China. As will be discussed below, an imbalance in nuclear capability can spur unduly aggressive or risky behavior.

Second, the United States has several strategic partnerships in East Asia which it has an interest in honoring and maintaining. The U.S.-Japanese alliance has served as a stabilizing force in the region by preventing Japan from developing significant military capabilities. The U.S. relationship with South Korea permitted U.S. troops to guard the border with North Korea to deter any aggression and serve as a platform for a quick military response to any provocative action. Finally, the U.S. has a longstanding commitment to resolving the question of Taiwan's status peacefully. Should China move aggressively toward Taiwan (assuming Taiwan has not taken provocative action), the U.S. has committed to defend it with force. Finally, the United States maintains close ties with Australia, with which it has closer cultural and historical ties than the rest of East Asia. As an active participant in the liberal political order currently predominating global governance, the military and economic security of Australia will remain a high priority for U.S. policy in the region.

Third, the United States is interested in maintaining normal economic relations with the region. This includes the maintenance of free trade standards like open access to markets and low tariffs, and maintaining the right to free passage through maritime trade routes. These are both issues with which China has struggled and thus will be a significant part of the debate on this topic.

2. Global Policy Interests

The United States also has a number of global interests which the rise of China may well impact. In relation to national security, the United States is interested generally in combating terrorism and preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons. In particular, the United States is strongly interested in preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. China is a major purchaser of Iranian oil, so any diplomatic, economic, or military means to prevent Iranian nuclearization could well be problematized by China.

The United States also remains at least nominally committed to promoting human rights and democracy, though the missionary zeal of the Bush Administration has long since been displaced by the pragmatism of the Obama Administration. Still, China's atrocious record on human rights in its own country and its understandable reticence to pressure others to respect human rights does not bode well. China seems to remain very committed to the idea that state sovereignty is nearly absolute in international relations.

Next, the U.S. has a strong interest in protecting its tenuous economic growth coming out of the latest financial crisis and recession. This includes protecting its intellectual property (a subject over which it has sparred with China), maintaining channels of free trade and open markets, and protecting energy security. As the world's largest market and holder of an enormous amount of American public debt, China will have a substantial role to play in each of these interest areas.

Finally, there are several issues of global governance in which China might play a role. U.S. leaders have repeatedly emphasized that efforts to curb the effects of global climate change cannot be successful without cooperation from China, India, and other major developing economies. Similarly, global drug interdiction and human trafficking are areas where China's efforts have left something to be desired.

Any of these areas might be the lynchpin to controlling the biggest impact of China's Rise, so it would pay to be prepared to speak intelligently about most of them.

Pro Arguments

Rather than randomly listing arguments, I am going to examine both sides of the resolution through the lens of the three major theoretical perspectives on International Relations deployed by scholars. While I will reference individual issues, the best way to develop the sensibilities necessary to meaningfully weigh one issue against another is to have a feel for the underlying theory and assumptions you are deploying to evaluate the significance of various impacts.

A. Realism

International Relations Realism was the dominant perspective deployed by scholars and policymakers during the Cold War and is associated with traditional power politics. Realism analyzes states as if they were unitary, rational actors. While there are several overlapping varieties of realism, a dominant school is called "structural realism." The central thesis of this perspective is that the structure of the international system obliges states to act in particular ways. Notably, the international system is anarchic – there is no global government which can control the actions of individual states. Each state has some degree of military capability, and no states intentions are perfectly transparent. These factors combine to make the international arena a very dangerous place. As a result, realists predict, states will try to maximize their power relative to one another to protect themselves against unexpected aggression by hostile outsiders.

There are several reasons why realists might be optimistic about whether China's Rise can be peaceful. First, realists believe strongly in the principle of nuclear deterrence. States will not go to war if they know with virtual certainty that doing so will result in a devastating attack against millions of its citizens. For this dynamic to hold, both the U.S. and China must have a credible "second strike" capability; they must be able to withstand a nuclear strike from the adversary and still be able to retaliate with sufficiently devastating nuclear force. At the moment China's second strike capability is questionable, but China is working to modernize and expand its nuclear strike force. Somewhat counter-intuitively, China's expanding military capability may actually help to keep the peace over the next century.

On the other hand, many theorists argue that for the time being U.S. military superiority remains unquestioned, and that this will be enough to deter China from interfering too significantly with U.S. interests. Despite significant gains, China still spends much less on its military than the U.S., which far and away leads the world in defense spending. The U.S. ability to project force in East Asia is virtually unquestioned. If that's true, realists hope that China will have the good sense not to be too provocative for fear of military escalation.

Third, many realists observe that China's neighbors are very nervous about its increasing influence in the region. To avoid domination by a regional hegemon, many theorists predict that these states will join with the United States to "balance" China's growing power. Much like European power politics of centuries past, China will be prevented from becoming overly powerful in relation to its neighbors by the countervailing force of an opposing coalition of states.

B. Liberalism

International Relations Liberalism shares many assumptions with realism. For the most part it treats states as unitary rational actors and assumes that their interests are more or less fixed. However, Liberals are inclined to think that states are less concerned about relative power and more often concerned about their absolute power and wellbeing. In other words, economic and institutional incentives can spur individual states to cooperate rather than compete in the global arena.

There are at least three major reasons why IR liberals would be optimistic about China's Rise. First, China is strongly invested in the current system. It does not have a strong interest in revising the global economic system in particular because integration into the liberal trade regime has been key to its miraculous growth and development. Liberal ideology and collective

governance may make Chinese leaders a bit uncomfortable, but ultimately the system is working too well for China to adopt a heavily revisionist stance.

Second, China and the United States have high levels of economic integration. The United States is a major market for Chinese exports (which in turn are a major driver of Chinese economic growth), and China is in turn a major market for the U.S. and especially a major holder of U.S. debt. Significant economic tensions could be calamitous for either power. This is a form of economic mutually assured destruction; killing the trading relationship that has kept both countries afloat during the Great Recession would be both highly unpopular and very stupid.

Third, China takes part in many international organizations that might smooth its rise to a predominant position in the international system. China has long been a permanent member of UN Security Council, which gives it veto power over resolutions from that body. It takes part in global economic organizations which give more voice to wealthier nations, e.g. the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. As China's economy grows, its influence in these organizations will increase. Additionally, China takes part in regional transnational organizations like ASEAN. This participation might deepen China's investment in the current system and discourage more aggressive revisionism.

C. Constructivism

Constructivism calls into question some of the assumptions held by realists and liberals. In one of the seminal articles in constructivist thought, Alexander Wendt argued that "anarchy is what the state makes of it." In place of the belief that states are locked into certain types of power-maximizing behavior by the structure of the international system, constructivists argue that social, economic, and political interactions shape a global culture that determines what types of behaviors are normatively acceptable and which are not. For example, war between the United States and Western European powers is virtually unthinkable even though they would seem to pose a military threat to one another. Citizens and leaders of those states identify one another as allies rather than adversaries, and the resulting norms lead to peace rather than war. As you can see, constructivists are very interested in the identities that states *construct* for themselves and the cultural norms that result.

Constructivists have several reasons to be optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful rise for China. First, through the late 1990s and early 2000s, China engaged in a variety of cooperative endeavors that seemed to signal an increasing willingness to take on the responsibilities of a global power in the current system. For example, it led the way on the Six Party Talks with North

Korea to try to discourage that nation from further developing its nuclear capabilities. While subsequent relations between the U.S. and China have soured a bit, constructivists see the potential for China to regard itself as a key player in the existing global system.

Second, technology is creating a world where culture is more global than it has ever been. International relations are no longer simply about the interactions of government leaders but also the economic and social interactions that effortlessly cross borders and oceans. It is much more difficult for any nation to construct another as a hated enemy, even in China where state controls on the media are infamous. Constructivists hope that over time it is our connections which shape our sense of shared identity with China rather than our conflicting interests.

Third, there are simply a number of areas where Chinese and American interests converge. Both nations view free trade as the key factor in maintaining economic growth. Both nations want a peaceful resolution on the status of Taiwan and a non-nuclear North Korea. Both have a strong interest in Middle Eastern energy security to fuel their economies. Constructivists hope that all of this convergence leads both states to regard each other as partners rather than rivals.

Con Arguments

A. Realism

Many realists, however, are pessimistic about China's Rise. First, realism predicts that states will attempt to maximize their security by achieving regional and if possible global hegemony. John Mearsheimer argues that the United States has accomplished regional hegemony in North America, but that it is not a global hegemon in a meaningful sense of that term. Absent the ability to project force globally, regional hegemons try to prevent others from achieving that same status. Again, the goal is to maximize your own security by maintaining a power imbalance with potential threats. As such, it makes sense for the United States to try to contain China's growth to protect itself from possible aggression and to prevent China from thwarting U.S. interests. China, on the other hand, has an incentive to try to balance U.S. power to increase its own security.

Second, the U.S. and China seem to be subject to a classic security dilemma. As either state grows its military capability, the other cannot know whether intentions are hostile or merely defensive. So, each state is obliged to respond by building up its own capability further. This spiraling arms race is increasingly costly and builds tensions which can easily boil over into conflict when an acute crisis presents itself.

Third, it seems clear that China's pursuit of regional hegemony in East Asia requires significantly reducing the projection of American power in that area. China has already undertaken efforts to expand its naval capabilities to control larger sections of the oceans and seas surrounding it and has started to build up its nuclear capabilities. Given U.S. military commitments in the region this could obviously lead to increased tensions.

B. Liberalism

Liberals, too, can argue that China's Rise is likely to be hostile to U.S. interests. First, as I indicated above, the United States has many alliances that commit it to a military presence in East Asia. This includes notably commitments to help defend South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan in the event of a military attack. This can be seen both as a way to contain China but also to preserve the sovereignty and right to self-determination of these nations.

Second, liberals will be quick to note China's historical resistance to external pressure for reform. As a general rule China maintains that respect for a nation's sovereignty trumps the obligation to promote democracy and human rights. The Communist Party does not believe in these things for its own citizens, let alone promoting them elsewhere. The hope that China could contribute to U.S. foreign policy goals based on institutionalizing these norms may well be in vain.

Third, some liberals argue that China's participation in international institutions is not an indicator of investment in the system but rather a means to block to international efforts of other states. For instance, whether the UN Security Council can pass and enforce economic sanctions on Iran depends largely on whether China agrees to cooperate with the sanctions regime. International institutions may be less a vehicle for cooperation than a tool to block effort of Western liberal states to promote democracy and human rights or combat the hostility of rogue states.

Finally, the self-doubting liberal will remember that economic interdependence doesn't always prevent nations from going to war. The period leading up to World War I was characterized by a high degree of economic interdependence among the warring parties but that did not stop hostilities from boiling over into armed conflict.

C. Constructivism

A constructivist could also make the case that a peaceful rise for China is unlikely. Increasing openness within the Chinese government has made the Communist Party more susceptible to public criticism, characterized particularly by appeals to nationalism. Many believe that this is a

major explanation for China's less conciliatory tone in recent years. Nationalism is also a motivator in the United States, where the desire to maintain the status as a world economic and military leader is likely to clash with China's reasonable ambitions. It seems easy under these circumstances for the nations to identify one another as competitors rather than allies.

Second, historical hostilities in East Asia may well serve as an impediment to China's peaceful rise. Many states in the region fear Chinese domination, and the relationship between Japan and China is particularly sour due to the history of Japanese imperialism. Similarly, tensions with India, Russia, and the nations of Southeast Asia may incite those nations to either balance against China's increasing power or in any case resist Chinese influence.

Third, a constructivist might point out that China has often accused international human rights regimes of being Western-centric. These criticisms suggest that documents like the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights or the International Convention on Civil and Political rights unduly emphasize individualistic freedoms like freedom of speech and fail to recognize the importance of economic and cultural rights. For that reason, they argue, Chinese leaders may not feel a strong connection to canons of supposed 'universal' values espoused by powerful Western states. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that the Communist Party could ever be fully committed to free markets.

Conclusion

This topic offers tremendous depth. Thorough research and preparation for the weighing debate will be the keys to success. Good luck!

FRAMEWORK EVIDENCE

THE "RISE OF CHINA" DEFINED

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

CHINA IS well on its way to becoming a formidable global power. The size of its economy has quadrupled since the launch of market reforms in the late 1970S and, by some estimates, will double again over the next decade. It has become one of the world's major manufacturing centers and consumes roughly a third of the global supply of iron, steel, and coal. It has accumulated massive foreign reserves, worth more than \$1 trillion at the end of 2006. China's military spending has increased at an inflation-adjusted rate of over 18 percent a year, and its diplomacy has extended its reach not just in Asia but also in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. Indeed, whereas the Soviet Union rivaled the United States as a military competitor only, China is emerging as both a military and an economic rival-heralding a profound shift in the distribution of global power.

CHINA IS POISED TO CATCH UP TO THE UNITED STATES' MILITARY AND ECONOMIC POWER

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

The country best positioned to challenge America's preeminence, first in East Asia, and then perhaps later globally, is China. If China's economy continues to grow for two more decades at anything close to the rate of the last two decades, then it will eventually rival and even surpass the United States in the size of its gross domestic product (GDP—measured in purchasing power parity terms, not in constant dollar terms), although not in per capita GDP.¹ Even if its economy never catches up to America's, China's remarkable economic growth has already given it significant political influence in East Asia, and that influence will only grow as China's economy continues to grow. Moreover, having emerged as the low-cost manufacturing platform of the world, China's economic influence extends well beyond East Asia and affects not only the rich great powers but also the struggling smaller developing ones, because of both its competitive prices for low-cost goods and its voracious appetite for raw materials. China is determined to climb up the technological ladder and may well give the United States a run for its money.² China is already the dominant military land power on the East Asian mainland, and it has made significant strides in creating pockets of excellence in its armed forces. If it continues to channel a healthy portion of its GDP into its military forces over several more decades, and if it makes a determined naval and air power projection effort, China might be able to deploy a maritime force that could contest America's supremacy at sea in East Asia, much as the German fleet built by Alfred von Tirpitz in the decade before World War I posed a severe threat to the British fleet in the North Sea.

U.S. INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA DEFINED

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

The United States has six overarching interests in East Asia. They are: first, preservation of Sino-American mutual assured destruction; second, stability in the Taiwan Strait and a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; third, the denuclearization and ultimate unification of the Korean peninsula; fourth, the preservation of the U.S.–Japan alliance and the maintenance of Japan's non-nuclear status; fifth, the peaceful settlement of China's maritime disputes with its neighbors and the preservation of freedom of commercial navigation in the South China Sea; and sixth, the preservation of economic openness in East Asia. I consider each in turn.

AFFIRMATIVE EVIDENCE

ALIGNMENT OF U.S. AND CHINESE INTERESTS

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES BROADLY AGREE ON MOST OF AMERICA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN EAST ASIA

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

This survey of America's interests and goals in the region makes clear one point of crucial significance for Sino-American relations: China and the United States share a broad agreement on these goals, even if they do not wholly agree on the means to attain them or on the priority that each state gives to these goals. China wants to have a secure second-strike capability. It prefers stability in the Taiwan Strait, a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status, and no unilateral moves toward independence. China favors denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and perhaps even the reunification of Korea if that brings with it the departure of American troops from the peninsula. It certainly favors preventing Japan from going nuclear, even if it no longer sees the U.S.-Japan alliance as firm a restraint on Japan as it once was.⁴⁵ China appears to favor the peaceful settlement of its maritime disputes with its neighbors; it clearly benefits from economic openness with the United States and among states within the region; and it does not want to see economic closure with either. At this general level, then, America's goals for the region are also China's goals for the region. To stress that China and the United States share many common goals for East Asia is not to make light of their many differences. What makes this rivalry different from the three previous ones discussed above, however, is that there is a basic agreement between China and the United States on many fundamental goals. Disputes over means to achieve goals are easier to manage than disputes over goals. There is clearly more room for bargaining, horse trading, and successful negotiation in the former case than in the latter. China and the United States may well end up contesting the primacy of the other in the region, but ironically, they both share an important set of common goals, even if they may not be able to agree in the future on who is, or should be, number one in the region.

THE U.S. SHOULD WELCOME A MORE ASSERTIVE CHINA AS A PARTNER IN ADDRESSING GLOBAL ISSUES

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Despite the image of a more powerful China seeking to drive events under the rubric of a new grand strategy, Beijing -- with a few important exceptions -- has been reacting, however abrasively, to unwelcome and unforeseen events that have often been initiated by others. In many ways, China's foreign policy was more creative and proactive in the two years leading up to the financial crisis than it is today. Between 2006 and 2008, China adopted constructive and assertive policies toward North Korea, Sudan, and Somali piracy that were unprecedented in the history of the People's Republic of China's foreign relations. The United States and its diplomatic partners should promote the return of such an assertive China -- without which Washington will face greater difficulty in addressing pressing global challenges such as nuclear proliferation, climate change, and global economic instability. China has become far too big to stand on the sidelines -- let alone to stand in the way -- while others attempt to resolve these issues.

IN THE MID-2000S, CHINA RESPONDED TO U.S. POLICY BY TAKING A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN GLOBAL ISSUES

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

In September 2005, then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick called for China to become a "responsible stakeholder" on the international stage. The goal of this Bush administration initiative was to move the U.S.-Chinese relationship beyond traditional bilateral issues -- relations across the Taiwan Strait, human rights, and economic frictions -- and toward cooperation on ensuring stability in places such as Northeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Africa.

In the following two years, the Chinese responded impressively, although only partially, to this shift in U.S. policy. Beijing not only continued to host the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program but also participated in the crafting of international sanctions against Pyongyang in the UN Security Council. Especially in late 2006 and early 2007, China also exerted bilateral economic pressure on North Korea, which led to the disablement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, the only concrete progress made to date as part of the six-party talks.

Beijing also changed course on Sudan. It went from protecting Sudan's regime against international pressure over human rights abuses in Darfur to backing then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's three-phase plan for peace and stability in the region in late 2006. Chinese officials pressured Khartoum to accept the second phase of that plan, which called for the creation of a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force. Then, in early 2007, after a dialogue about the region between the U.S. State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing agreed to send more than 300 Chinese military engineers to Darfur, the first non-African peacekeepers committed to the UN operation. In late 2008, China also agreed to send a naval contingent to the Gulf of Aden to assist in the international effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Perhaps most significant, considering Beijing's traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the UN resolution enabling the mission allowed for the pursuit of pirates into Somalia's territorial waters.

THE U.S. AND CHINA ARE UNLIKELY TO GO TO WAR BECAUSE THEY CAN PURSUE THEIR INTERESTS WITHOUT POSING A SIGNIFICANT THREAT TO EACH OTHER

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

What does all this imply about the rise of China? At the broadest level, the news is good. Current international conditions should enable both the United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Nuclear weapons make it relatively easy for major powers to maintain highly effective deterrent forces. Even if Chinese power were to greatly exceed U.S. power somewhere down the road, the United States would still be able to maintain nuclear forces that could survive any Chinese attack and threaten massive damage in retaliation. Large-scale conventional attacks by China against the U.S. homeland, meanwhile, are virtually impossible because the United States and China are separated by the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, across which it would be difficult to attack. No foreseeable increase in China's power would be large enough to overcome these twin advantages of defense for the United States. The same defensive advantages, moreover, apply to China as well. Although China is currently much weaker than the United States militarily, it will soon be able to build a nuclear force that meets its requirements for deterrence. And China should not find the United States' massive conventional capabilities especially threatening, because the bulk of U.S. forces, logistics, and support lie across the Pacific.

The overall effect of these conditions is to greatly moderate the security dilemma. Both the United States and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status. This should help Washington and Beijing avoid truly strained geopolitical relations, which should in turn help ensure that the security dilemma stays moderate, thereby facilitating cooperation. The United States, for example, will have the option to forego responding to China's modernization of its nuclear force. This restraint will help reassure China that the United States does not want to threaten its security-and thus help head off a downward political spiral fueled by nuclear competition.

CHINESE INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ORDER

THE RISE OF CHINA NEED NOT BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE WESTERN-LIBERAL ORDER

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely-eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join.

This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order-if managed properly-will live on.

THE US CAN MANAGE CHINA'S RISE BY EXERCISING ITS INFLUENCE TO STRENGTHEN THE WESTERN POLITICAL ORDER

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

As it faces an ascendant China, the United States should remember that its leadership of the Western order allows it to shape the environment in which China will make critical strategic choices. If it wants to preserve this leadership, Washington must work to strengthen the rules and institutions that underpin that order-making it even easier to join and harder to overturn. U.S. grand strategy should be built around the motto "The road to the East runs through the West." It must sink the roots of this order as deeply as possible, giving China greater incentives for integration than for opposition and increasing the chances that the system will survive even after U.S. relative power has declined. The United States' "unipolar moment" will inevitably end. If the defining struggle of the twenty-first century is between China and the United States, China will have the advantage. If the defining struggle is between China and a revived Western system, the West will triumph.

THE WESTERN POLITICAL ORDER IS UNIQUELY DIFFICULT TO OVERTURN

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

THE POSTWAR Western order is historically unique. Any international order dominated by a powerful state is based on a mix of coercion and consent, but the U.S.-led order is distinctive in that it has been more liberal than imperial-and so unusually accessible, legitimate, and durable. Its rules and institutions are rooted in, and thus reinforced by, the evolving global forces of democracy and capitalism. It is expansive, with a wide and widening array of participants and stakeholders. It is capable of generating tremendous economic growth and power while also signaling restraint-all of which make it hard to overturn and easy to join.

THE WESTERN ECONOMIC ORDER IS PREMISED ON NON-DISCRIMINATION AND OPEN MARKETS, MAKING IT POSSIBLE FOR NATIONS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SYSTEM MORE EASILY

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

First, unlike the imperial systems of the past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of nondiscrimination and market openness, creating conditions for rising states to advance their expanding economic and political goals within it. Across history, international orders have varied widely in terms of whether the material benefits that are generated accrue disproportionately to the leading state or are widely shared. In the Western system, the barriers to economic participation are low, and the potential benefits are high. China has already discovered the massive economic returns that are possible by operating within this open-market system.

**THE WESTERN ORDER IS GOVERNED BY A COALITION OF LIKE-MINDED STATES,
MAKING IT HARDER TO OVERTHROW**

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states-and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power-shifts the balance in the order's favor.

THE FACT THAT THE WESTERN ORDER IS LARGELY RULE-BASED AND INSTITUTIONAL, MAKING IT EASIER TO INTEGRATE RATHER THAN OVERTHROW IT

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions global and regional, economic, political, and security related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system. The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment-especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past-making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful.

CHINA HAS STRONG INCENTIVES TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORDER

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

The Western order's strong framework of rules and institutions is already starting to facilitate Chinese integration. At first, China embraced certain rules and institutions for defensive purposes: protecting its sovereignty and economic interests while seeking to reassure other states of its peaceful intentions by getting involved in regional and global groupings. But as the scholar Marc Lanteigne argues, "What separates China from other states, and indeed previous global powers, is that not only is it 'growing up' within a milieu of international institutions far more developed than ever before, but more importantly, it is doing so while making active use of these institutions to promote the country's development of global power status." China, in short, is increasingly working within, rather than outside of, the Western order.

China is already a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a legacy of Roosevelt's determination to build the universal body around diverse great-power leadership. This gives China the same authority and advantages of "great-power exceptionalism" as the other permanent members. The existing global trading system is also valuable to China, and increasingly so. Chinese economic interests are quite congruent with the current global economic system—a system that is open and loosely institutionalized and that China has enthusiastically embraced and thrived in. State power today is ultimately based on sustained economic growth, and China is well aware that no major state can modernize without integrating into the globalized capitalist system; if a country wants to be a world power, it has no choice but to join the World Trade Organization (WTO). The road to global power, in effect, runs through the Western order and its multilateral economic institutions.

CHINA MUST MAINTAIN ITS INTEGRATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM TO HAVE ACCESS TO TRADE RULES THAT SUPPORT ITS GROWTH

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

China not only needs continued access to the global capitalist system; it also wants the protections that the system's rules and institutions provide. The WTO's multilateral trade principles and dispute-settlement mechanisms, for example, offer China tools to defend against the threats of discrimination and protectionism that rising economic powers often confront. The evolution of China's policy suggests that Chinese leaders recognize these advantages: as Beijing's growing commitment to economic liberalization has increased the foreign investment and trade China has enjoyed, so has Beijing increasingly embraced global trade rules. It is possible that as China comes to champion the WTO, the support of the more mature Western economies for the WTO will wane. But it is more likely that both the rising and the declining countries will find value in the quasi-legal mechanisms that allow conflicts to be settled or at least diffused.

MILITARY DETERRENCE

WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.–China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction.

TO MAINTAIN PEACEFUL RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, CHINA MUST MAINTAIN A CREDIBLE SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

For reasons outlined above, it is crucial that neither the United States nor China believes it is vulnerable to a disarming nuclear first strike by the other. With its sophisticated and large nuclear forces, the United States remains secure from such a strike by any state, including China. China's second-strike capability, however, is not as secure as it needs to be, and according to some analysts, is highly vulnerable to an American first strike.²⁵ China needs to make its nuclear forces sufficiently robust such that the United States can have no confidence that it could launch a disarming first strike. It will therefore need to expend resources to make its nuclear forces more secure, and it is in the process of doing so.²⁶

From an American perspective, this conclusion may sound odd. After all, if the United States possesses a disarming first-strike capability against China, is that not in America's interest? True, this capability gives the United States a military advantage that could potentially be used for political intimidation during a crisis, but appealing as this logic may seem, it is more in America's interest that decision makers of all nuclear-armed states run scared, not safe, vis-à-vis one another. Such decision makers must believe that neither side has an advantage in striking first against the adversary's nuclear forces, because that might embolden one or both of them to take greater risks during a crisis and tip the crisis toward war—and even all-out war—rather than toward de-escalation. It is not in America's interest (or China's) for American decision makers to believe that they can disarm China's nuclear forces. Therefore, just as it served America's best interests for the Soviet Union to have a secure second-strike force once the Soviet Union had acquired nuclear weapons, so, too, is it in America's interest to have China achieve one.²⁷

U.S. POWER CAN DETER CHINESE AGGRESSION

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

Back then, experts debated whether U.S. capabilities were sufficient to deter a massive Soviet conventional attack against Europe. They disagreed over whether NATO's doctrine of flexible response—which combined large conventional forces with an array of nuclear forces—enabled the United States to make nuclear threats credible conditions should enable enough to deter a Soviet conventional attack. Doubts about U.S. willingness to escalate reflected the clear danger that U.S. escalation would be met by Soviet nuclear retaliation. Nevertheless, the stronger argument in this debate held that U.S. strategy did provide an adequate deterrent to a Soviet conventional attack, because even a small probability of U.S. nuclear escalation presented the Soviets with overwhelming risks. The same logic should apply to a future Chinese superpower. The combination of clear alliance commitments, forward deployed conventional forces, and large survivable nuclear forces should enable the United States to deter a Chinese attack on either Japan or South Korea.

Confidence in the U.S. deterrent is likely to be reinforced by relatively good relations between the United States and China. Those who feared that the United States could not extend its deterrent to Western Europe believed that the Soviet Union was a highly revisionist state bent on radically overturning the status quo and willing to run enormous risks in the process. There is virtually no evidence suggesting that China has such ambitious goals, so extending the U.S. deterrent should be easier now than during the Cold War. And even in the unlikely event that China evolved into such a dangerous state, deterrence would still be possible, albeit more difficult.

A CHINESE DRIVE FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND INFEASIBLE

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

Some realist pessimists argue that in order to be highly secure, China will find itself compelled to pursue regional hegemony, fueling conflict along the way. However, China's size, power, location, and nuclear arsenal will make it very challenging to attack successfully. China will not need to push the United States out of its region in order to be secure, because a forward U.S. presence will not undermine China's core deterrent capabilities. A major U.S. withdrawal, moreover, would not automatically yield Chinese regional hegemony, because Japan and South Korea might then acquire stronger conventional military capabilities and nuclear capabilities of their own, greatly reducing China's coercive potential. A Chinese drive for regional hegemony, therefore, would be both unnecessary and infeasible.

THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCE WILL HELP IMPROVE MUTUAL DETERRENCE

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

The danger of an exaggerated security threat is even greater in the nuclear realm. The Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review holds that "the United States and China's Asian neighbors remain concerned about China's current military modernization efforts, including its qualitative and quantitative modernization of its nuclear arsenal." The NPR, however, does not identify just what danger China's military modernization poses. There is no prospect that any conceivable nuclear modernization in the foreseeable future will enable China to destroy the bulk of U.S. nuclear forces and undermine the United States' ability to retaliate massively. The most such modernization might do is eliminate a significant U.S. nuclear advantage by providing China with a larger and more survivable force, thereby reducing the United States' ability to credibly threaten China with nuclear escalation during a severe crisis.

CHINA'S DESIRE TO IMPROVE ITS MILITARY CAPABILITIES SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS AN AGGRESSIVE MOVE

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

There is no question that China's conventional and nuclear buildups will reduce some U.S. capabilities that Washington would prefer to retain. But the United States should not rush to impute malign motives to those buildups and should instead be sensitive to the possibility that they simply reflect China's legitimate desire for security. When Donald Rumsfeld was U.S. secretary of defense, he said, apropos of China's increased defense spending, that "since no nation threatens China, one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?" The answer should have been obvious. If China were able to operate carrier battle groups near the U.S. coast and attack the U.S. homeland with long-range bombers, Washington would naturally want the ability to blunt such capabilities, and if the United States had a strategic nuclear force as vulnerable and comparatively small as China's (now somewhere between a tenth and a hundredth the size of the U.S. force), it would try to catch up as quickly as it had the resources to do so. Those actions would not have been driven by any nefarious plan to subjugate the world, and so far there are strong reasons to believe that the same holds true for China's course.

THE BIGGEST THREAT TO U.S./CHINA RELATIONS COMES FROM EXAGGERATING THREATS

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

REALIST ANALYSES of how power transitions will play out are based on the assumption that states accurately perceive and respond to the international situations they face. Realist optimism in this case thus rests on the assumption that U.S. leaders appreciate, and will be able to act on, the unusually high degree of security that the United States actually enjoys. Should this assumption prove incorrect, and should the United States exaggerate the threat China poses, the risks of future conflict will be greater. Unfortunately, there are some reasons for worrying that the assumption might in fact be wrong.

For example, the popular belief that a rising China will severely threaten U.S. security could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Should Washington fail to understand that China's growing military capabilities do not threaten vital U.S. interests, it may adopt overly competitive military and foreign policies, which may in turn signal to China that the United States has malign motives. Should China then feel less secure, it will be more likely to adopt competitive policies that the United States will see as more threatening. The result would be a negative spiral driven not by the international situation the states actually faced but by their exaggerated insecurities.

Moreover, states have often overestimated their insecurity by failing to appreciate the extent to which military capabilities favored defense. Before World War I, Germany exaggerated the ease of invasion and therefore believed that Russia's growing power threatened its survival. As a result, Germany launched an unnecessary preventive war. During the Cold War, the United States exaggerated the nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union, failing to appreciate that large improvements in Soviet forces left the key aspect of the American deterrent—a massive retaliatory capability—entirely intact. This did not lead to war, thankfully, but it did increase the risks of one and led to much unnecessary tension and expenditure. Washington will have to guard against making similar errors down the road as China's conventional and nuclear forces grow and as clashes over secondary issues strain relations.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

TRYING TO SLOW CHINA'S RISE WOULD TRIGGER ECONOMIC WARFARE THAT WOULD HURT EVERYONE

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

For starters, a determined policy to hurt China economically so as to slow its growth would hurt the United States economically as well, because the two have a high level of economic interdependence with one another, even if that interdependence is not symmetric. Who would be hurt more is difficult to say, but both could be hurt substantially in any determined and vicious policy of economic warfare.

The most direct way for the United States to hurt China would be to block all of China's exports to the United States. In 2008 (the most recent figures available), China (which includes mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao) exported \$364 billion to the United States, or 20 percent of its total exports of \$1.8 trillion for the year.⁸ In 2008, China's GDP (in current dollars) was \$4.3 trillion.⁹ This means that in 2008, 8.5 percent of China's GDP was exported to the United States, an astoundingly high figure, and one that looks as if it creates a huge dependency of China on access to the U.S. market.¹⁰ This dependency is large, but not quite as large as the above figures would imply, because, as Richard Cooper points out, China's exports are measured in terms of gross value, not the value added in China. Because many of China's exports involve the processing of imports, a total cessation of exports to the United States would be something less than 8.5 percent of GDP.¹¹ Still, the abrupt loss of the U.S. market would be highly disruptive in the short term to China.

The problem is that such a policy of economic warfare would be highly disruptive to the United States, as well, because China holds a powerful financial lever over the United States and could retaliate. As of March 2010, China held \$895 billion (11.5 percent) of the \$7.8 trillion total outstanding U.S. Treasury securities that are privately held (as of December 2009). China is now the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury securities, with Japan second at \$785 billion.¹² China could retaliate against an American embargo on China's exports by dumping its holdings of Treasury securities or by refusing to buy any more. That would hurt the value of these holdings because it would depress their price and thus hurt China, but the United States, too, would be hurt in the process. Unless others stepped in to pick up the slack, interest rates would have to rise in the United States, probably significantly, and that would bring on a recession, or perhaps even something worse—a financial crisis.

ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST CHINA WOULD BE UNSUCCESSFUL BECAUSE OTHER STATES WOULD NOT SUPPORT SANCTIONS

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Third, waging economic warfare through a ban on Chinese exports to the United States, a cessation of U.S. foreign direct investment in China, a ban on U.S. agricultural and high-technology exports to China, and the like, will not work if only the United States imposes them. Historically, the evidence about economic warfare suggests that it does not work or will not work well if only one country wages it, even if that country is as powerful as the United States. Sanctions are more effective when all of a country's trading partners work in unison and when multilateral sanctions are supported by an international organization, which makes the multilateral coalition more robust and durable. 14 Evidence and logic therefore suggest that in the event of U.S. economic warfare against a China that had not become aggressive, other countries would merely step in to fill the shoes of the United States. This result seems all the more probable given the fact that the Chinese economy is a powerful economic magnet not only in East Asia but also globally. Other states would be more than happy to see a cessation of American economic competition for the fruits of China's economy. The China market is simply too important to too many states for them to cooperate with the United States in waging economic warfare against a state that is pursuing a peaceful rise strategy.

HISTORICAL COMPARISONS

NOT ALL POWER TRANSITIONS ARE PRONE TO MILITARY CONFLICT

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

But not all power transitions generate war or overturn the old order. In the early decades of the twentieth century, the United Kingdom ceded authority to the United States without great conflict or even a rupture in relations. From the late 1940s to the early 1990s, Japan's economy grew from the equivalent of five percent of U.S. GDP to the equivalent of over 60 percent of U.S. GDP, and yet Japan never challenged the existing international order.

Clearly, there are different types of power transitions. Some states have seen their economic and geopolitical power grow dramatically and have still accommodated themselves to the existing order. Others have risen up and sought to change it. Some power transitions have led to the breakdown of the old order and the establishment of a new international hierarchy. Others have brought about only limited adjustments in the regional and global system.

A variety of factors determine the way in which power transitions unfold. The nature of the rising state's regime and the degree of its dissatisfaction with the old order are critical: at the end of the nineteenth century, the United States, a liberal country an ocean away from Europe, was better able to embrace the British-centered international order than Germany was. But even more decisive is the character of the international order itself-for it is the nature of the international order that shapes a rising state's choice between challenging that order and integrating into it.

CHINA'S "PEACEFUL RISE" STRATEGY IS DESIGNED TO REASSURE CHINA'S NEIGHBORS AND PREVENT COALITIONS OF HOSTILE POWERS FROM FORMING

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Much has been made of China's strategy of "peaceful rise" (which is now called "peaceful development"). According to Avery Goldstein, it consists of two main efforts: first; to emphasize to China's neighbors, by actions and not simply words, that China is a responsible and cooperative member of the international community; and second, to improve relations with the world's leading states. The first involves an active multilateral policy and the avoidance of a heavy-handed unilateralism in asserting China's interests; the second, cultivating good bilateral relations with major powers to demonstrate the advantages of dealing with China.⁴ The first is a reassurance strategy to assuage the fears of China's neighbors about its rising power; the second is a calculated policy to prevent a hostile coalition of great powers from forming. The strategy of peaceful rise is the policy of a weak state, of a great power not yet arrived, but of one whose power is growing, that needs a peaceful environment for its power to continue to grow, and that wishes to avoid encirclement as it grows more powerful.

TRYING TO SLOW CHINA'S RISE WOULD BE A MISTAKE BECAUSE CHINA IS NOT AS AGGRESSIVE AS THE SOVIET UNION WAS

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Second, waging economic warfare against China, when it appears unprovoked by any Chinese actions, would backfire politically against the United States. Unless imposed in retaliation against some grievous Chinese aggression, such a policy would smack of U.S. unilateralism and would not be supported by other states. The political results for the United States could be disastrous, including a severe hollowing out, or even destruction, of its main East Asian alliances. The problem for the United States is that China is not the Soviet Union: China does not have the same heavy-handed policy, missionary zeal, and threatening military posture that the Soviets did. As a consequence, economic warfare would bring disastrous economic and political results for the United States.

CHINA'S RISE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE SAME TYPE OF GEOPOLITICAL THREAT THAT SOVIET EXPANSION DID

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

China's rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, China's domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate.

THE IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IS LESS PRONOUNCED THAN IT WAS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE COLD WAR

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

Another important difference between the Cold War and a future Sino– American rivalry concerns ideology. The superpower competition was especially intense because it was driven by sharp ideological differences between the two sides as well as by geopolitical considerations. Communism and liberal capitalism were potent ideological foes not only because they offered fundamentally different views about how society should be ordered, but also because both American and Soviet leaders thought that communism was an exportable political model that would eventually take root all over the globe. This notion helped fuel the infamous 'domino theory', which helped convince US leaders that they had to fight communism everywhere on the planet. Soviet leaders had real concerns, as the spread of liberal capitalism posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of Marxist rule. The incompatibility of these rival ideological visions thus reinforced the zero-sum nature of the rivalry, and encouraged leaders on both sides to wage it with unusual intensity.

There are certainly some ideological differences between China and the United States, but they do not affect the relationship between the two countries in profound ways, and there is no good reason to think that they will in the foreseeable future. In particular, China has embraced a market-based economy, and does not see its current version of state capitalism as an exportable model for the rest of the world. If anything, it is the United States that shows a greater tendency to want to export its system to others, but that ambition is likely to be tempered by setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the impact of the 2008 recession. This situation should work to make a future rivalry between Beijing and Washington less intense than the ideological-laden competition between the superpowers.

ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL FLASHPOINTS

CHINA IS COMMITTED TO THE POSITION THE TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA, AND THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF TAIWAN'S STATUS

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

The U.S. position on what Taiwan's ultimate status should be is deliberately not crystal clear, although it has become progressively clearer in recent years. The United States does not favor a two-China policy, or a one-China and one-Taiwan policy, nor does it support Taiwan's unilateral declaration of independence. This position comes awfully close to a U.S. de facto acceptance of Taiwan as part of China, but the U.S. government has not explicitly said so in order to keep open the option of Taiwanese independence should both the mainland and Taiwan agree to it. This is an outcome, of course, to which the mainland would never agree.

The U.S. position on *how* Taiwan's status is to be settled, however, is crystal clear: it will not allow China to use force to bring Taiwan to heel. Rather, the United States is committed to the peaceful resolution of Taiwan's status. Because of this commitment, the United States must have sufficient military power in the region to deter China from using force to resolve Taiwan's status, or to protect Taiwan should the mainland use force against a Taiwanese government that had not provoked the mainland by moving toward, or actually declaring, independence. (The U.S. stance on protecting a Taiwan that had provoked a mainland attack by moving toward or declaring independence is not clear, but it should be: any Taiwan government that acts in such a fashion is on its own.)

Why does the United States favor a peaceful settlement of Taiwan's ultimate status? The answer is clear: the United States cannot back away from this commitment, for reasons that have to do largely with the credibility of its other commitments in East Asia. If the United States reneged on this commitment and allowed the mainland to reintegrate Taiwan forcibly into China, then America's commitment to Japan, as well as its reliability in the eyes of its other allies in East Asia, would suffer grievous harm. Why would Japan, for example, continue to put stock in the U.S.–Japan alliance, and America's commitments to defend it, if the United States failed to defend Taiwan from an unprovoked attack by the mainland? For better or worse, how Taiwan's status is settled bears centrally on America's overall political–military position in East Asia.

KOREAN REUNIFICATION IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST BECAUSE IT WOULD ALLOW US TO WITHDRAW A MILITARY PRESENCE THAT IS PROVOCATIVE TO CHINA

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

How much these threats have been part of North Korea's coercive diplomacy is not clear, but whatever the regime's actual policy is, there is strong circumstantial although not definitive evidence, according to both the George W. Bush administration and to experts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, that North Korea sold 1.87 tons of uranium hexafluoride to Libya.³³ Given the Kim Jong-il government's past history of drug running, counterfeiting, and sale of missiles, together with the suspicions that it sold fissile material to Libya, it would be foolhardy to trust this regime never to sell fissile material to terrorists. A much safer though difficult course is to work to denuclearize the regime and the peninsula.

The nuclear issue aside, over the longer term, the unification of the Korean peninsula under South Korea's leadership is in America's interest because it would mean that the United States could withdraw its troops from the Asian mainland. The purpose of their presence there is to deter a North Korean attack, not to wage war against China. So, if North Korea ceases to exist and Korea is unified, these troops could be withdrawn. Unless a strong argument can be made that American troops need to remain in a unified Korea in order to make American troops in Japan more politically palatable to the Japanese, it is hard to find compelling reasons for keeping American troops on the Asian mainland, unless, of course, Korea and China were to have intensely hostile relations.³⁴ The more likely course would be for a united Korea to have friendly relations with China and to fall into China's economic and political sphere of influence, or in international relations theory lingo, a united Korea would choose to bandwagon with China, not balance against it. (Indeed, some observers argue that this process has already begun in South Korea.³⁵) In that case, there would be few tangible benefits, and too many potential risks, for the United States to retain a military presence on the Korean peninsula.

A STRONG ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN IS IN AMERICA'S INTEREST

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Fourth, it is crucial to America's position in East Asia, its general world position, and its global non-proliferation policy that the U.S.–Japan alliance remain solid and that Japan remain a non-nuclear state. The alliance and Japan's non-nuclear status are tightly linked: Japan eschews nuclear weapons, primarily or in part, depending on the analyst consulted, because of the nuclear umbrella that the United States extends over it.³⁶ Were Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, this would be a clear political statement that it puts little or no credence in the U.S.–Japan alliance. After all, why would Japan obtain nuclear weapons if it believed fully in the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee? Without the U.S. umbrella, Japan would either have to acquire its own nuclear weapons, or else forego them and thereby be at a political–military disadvantage vis-à-vis nuclear-armed North Korea and China, both of which Japan named for the first time in 2004 as potential threats to Japanese security, and perhaps even be subject to political intimidation by these two.³⁷

A solid U.S.–Japan alliance is the central cornerstone of America's political–military position in East Asia and one of the two cornerstones of America's global forward defense posture—the other being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance in Europe. The political demise of the U.S.–Japan alliance would dramatically alter—for the worse—America's forward defense posture in East Asia by making its power projection in the region more difficult and by signaling to other states there that America's firmest ally in the region no longer puts much credence in the alliance, with all the adverse effects on America's relations with its other allies in the region. In addition, the demise of the alliance could potentially affect NATO. That is, if an ally as close to the United States as Japan were perceived as no longer believing in the U.S. guarantee, then the Europeans could well begin to consider the credibility of America's guarantees to them also. Contagion considerations should be taken seriously here. Moreover, a Japan that goes nuclear would certainly not strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and could even mortally wound both. Finally, a Japan set free from the constraints of the U.S.–Japan alliance, and one that armed itself with nuclear weapons, would probably increase the political hostility between China and Japan that is already far too high, and probably between South Korea and Japan also, and set in motion undesirable security dilemma dynamics.

IT IS IN CHINA'S INTEREST TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED STATES ON CONTAINING IRANIAN NUCLEAR AMBITIONS

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

What is true for China's North Korea policy is also true for its policy toward Iran. China is a net importer of energy with a large export sector that would be greatly affected by sudden, sharp price increases in energy, which would raise the costs of both production and shipping. This reality should affect its calculus with Iran, a major destabilizing force in the energy-rich Middle East and Persian Gulf -- and one that would likely become only more destabilizing if its regime gained the added confidence of a nuclear deterrent. Moreover, Israel considers the development of Iranian nuclear weapons an existential threat; it appears quite probable that if diplomacy fails to alter the current trajectory of Iran's nuclear ambitions, Israel will eventually take military action against Iran. Such a turn of events could lead to massive instability in the region, threatening the free flow of energy on which China and all other net importers rely. It is therefore in Beijing's interest to work more closely with Washington and its allies -- all of which would like to see stable energy markets -- to craft diplomatic approaches that might prevent such an outcome.

CHINA HAS GENERALLY VIEWED THE U.S./JAPAN ALLIANCE AS A STABILIZING FORCE RATHER THAN A THREAT

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

The United States' forward military presence does enhance its power-projection capabilities, which threaten China's ability to protect its sea-lanes and coerce Taiwan. But the U.S. alliance with Japan also benefits China by enabling Japan to spend far less on defense. Although the United States' power far exceeds Japan's, China has seen the alliance as adding to regional stability, because it fears Japan more than the United States. As China grows more powerful, it may increasingly resent U.S. influence in Northeast Asia. But unless U.S.-Chinese relations become severely strained, China is likely to accept a continuing U.S. presence in the region, given the alternatives.

NEGATIVE EVIDENCE

HEGEMONIC TRANSITION

TRANSITIONS OF POWER IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM ARE INHERENTLY PRONE TO CONFLICT

G. John Ikenberry [Prof. of Politics and International Affairs, Princeton University], "The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 2008), pp. 23-37

Power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. As scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Robert Gilpin have described it, world politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order in which to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever: long-term changes in the distribution of power give rise to new challenger states, who set off a struggle over the terms of that international order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system-to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position.

These moments are fraught with danger. When a state occupies a commanding position in the international system, neither it nor weaker states have an incentive to change the existing order. But when the power of a challenger state grows and the power of the leading state weakens, a strategic rivalry ensues, and conflict perhaps leading to war-becomes likely. The danger of power transitions is captured most dramatically in the case of late-nineteenth-century Germany. In 1870, the United Kingdom had a three-to-one advantage in economic power over Germany and a significant military advantage as well; by 1903, Germany had pulled ahead in terms of both economic and military power. As Germany unified and grew, so, too, did its dissatisfactions and demands, and as it grew more powerful, it increasingly appeared as a threat to other great powers in Europe, and security competition began. In the strategic realignments that followed, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom, formerly enemies, banded together to confront an emerging Germany. The result was a European war. Many observers see this dynamic emerging in U.S.-Chinese relations. "If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades," the realist scholar John Mearsheimer has written, "the United States and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war."

THE RISE OF CHINA WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO SOME LEVEL OF CONFLICT

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Clearly, there will be political and economic conflicts and friction between the United States and China as China's economic and military power in East Asia and its global economic and political reach continue to expand. Clearly, there will also be some arms racing between China and the United States as each jockeys for advantage over the other, as each is driven by its respective military necessities of intimidating and defending Taiwan, and as the United States responds to China's growing power projection capabilities. Historically, dominant powers have not readily given up their position of number one to rising challengers, and rising challengers have always demanded the fruits to which they believe their growing power entitles them. There is no reason to expect that things will be different in this regard with China and the United States. Thus, they will not be able to avoid a certain level of conflictual relations and political friction over the next several decades.

SEVERAL FACTORS ARE LIKELY TO INCREASE TENSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND CHINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Robert J. Art [Prof. of International Relations, Brandeis University], "The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 125, No. 3 (2010)

Still, having said that, the United States and China are now entering a more difficult phase in their relationship, with the possible exception of the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, than they have experienced since Deng Xiaoping instituted his reforms in 1979. China is now "feeling its oats." Its economic growth has given it considerable clout. Its military power is causing the United States to adjust its power projection capabilities in the western Pacific, and its two navies can be expected "to bump up against one another" more frequently in the future. China's leadership is anxious about its hold on power and its legitimacy in the eyes of its people and, consequently, is acutely sensitive to any actions by the United States or others that would make the elite look soft on defending China's national interests.⁵⁹ Its populace takes great pride in China's accomplishments and its swift rise and, if anything, is more assertive than the leadership in claiming the rights that China's newfound power gives it. As a consequence, China's leaders will be less willing to pursue a foreign policy of accommodation and "lying low," and the strategy of peaceful rise, which has served China so well, will increasingly come into conflict with an assertive Chinese nationalism.

For its part, the United States will be acutely sensitive to any Chinese challenge to its position in East Asia out of fear that one challenge left unmet will cause its entire position to begin to unravel. The United States may well want China to assume the role of "responsible stakeholder" in the international system more generally, and to help pay the costs of keeping the system stable and prosperous, but it will also be at the ready to respond to any challenges to its East Asian maritime position, to its alliances and security relationships there, and to its perceived staying power. America's preoccupation with its credibility in East Asia in the face of growing Chinese power will make it quick, perhaps too quick, to respond firmly to Chinese challenges that are perceived to threaten its regional interests.

CHINA'S RISE IS UNLIKELY TO BE PEACEFUL BECAUSE IT'S NEIGHBORS AND THE UNITED STATES CAN NEVER BE CERTAIN OF ITS INTENTIONS

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

I examine here three key arguments that are often employed to support this optimistic prognosis. First, some claim that China can allay any fears about its rise by making it clear to its neighbors and the United States that it has peaceful intentions, that it will not use force to change the balance of power. This perspective can be found in the Defence White Paper, which states: 'The pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained, and if China does not reach out to others to build confidence regarding its military plans'.⁵ In essence, the belief here is that Beijing has the ability to signal its present and future intentions to Australia and other countries in compelling ways.

Unfortunately, states can never be certain about each other's intentions.⁶ They cannot know with a high degree of certainty whether they are dealing with a revisionist state or a status quo power. For example, there is still no consensus among experts as to whether the Soviet Union was bent on dominating Eurasia during the Cold War. Nor is there a consensus on whether Imperial Germany was a highly aggressive state that was principally responsible for causing the First World War. The root of the problem is that unlike military capabilities, which we can see and count, intentions cannot be empirically verified. Intentions are in the minds of decision makers and they are especially difficult to discern. One might think that Chinese leaders can use words to explain their intentions. But talk is cheap and leaders have been known to lie to foreign audiences.⁷ Thus, it is hard to know the intentions of China's present leaders, which is not to say that they are necessarily revisionist.

But even if one could determine China's intentions today, there is no way to know what they will be in the future. After all, it is impossible to identify who will be running the foreign policy of any country 5 or 10 years from now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. It cannot be emphasized enough that we face radical uncertainty when it comes to determining the future intentions of any country, China included.

BECAUSE STATES CAN'T DISTINGUISH BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE MILITARY CAPABILITIES, CHINA CANNOT MAINTAIN PEACE SIMPLY BY DEVELOPING DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

A second line of argument is that a benign China can avoid confrontation by building defensive rather than offensive military forces. In other words, Beijing can signal that it is a status quo power by denying itself the capability to use force to alter the balance of power. After all, a country that has hardly any offensive capability cannot be a revisionist state, because it does not have the means to act aggressively. Not surprisingly, Chinese leaders often claim that their military is designed solely for defensive purposes. For example, the New York Times recently reported in an important article on the Chinese navy that its leaders maintain that it is 'purely a self-defense force'.⁸

One problem with this approach is that it is difficult to distinguish between offensive and defensive military capabilities. Negotiators at the 1932 Disarmament Conference tried to make these distinctions and found themselves tied in knots trying to determine whether particular weapons like tanks and aircraft carriers are offensive or defensive in nature.⁹ The basic problem is that the capabilities that states develop to defend themselves often have significant offensive potential.

Consider what China is doing today. It is building military forces that have significant power projection capability, and as the Defence White Paper tells us, China's 'military modernization will be increasingly characterized by the development of power projection capabilities'.¹⁰ For example, the Chinese are building naval forces that can project power out to the so-called 'Second Island Chain' in the Western Pacific. And they also say that they are planning to build a 'blue water navy' that can operate in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. For understandable reasons, they want to be able to protect their sea lanes and not have to depend on the American navy to handle that mission for them. Although they do not have that capability yet, as Robert Kaplan points out in a recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, 'China's naval leaders are displaying the aggressive philosophy of the turn-of-the-twentieth-century US naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan, who argued for sea control and the decisive battle'.¹¹

CHINA'S RECENT BEHAVIOR CANNOT BE USED TO PREDICT THE FUTURE AS ACCURATELY AS THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

Finally, some maintain that China's recent behavior toward its neighbors, which has not been aggressive in any meaningful way, is a reliable indicator of how China will act in the decades ahead. The central problem with this argument is that past behavior is usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior because leaders come and go and some are more hawkish than others. Also, circumstances at home and abroad can change in ways that make the use of military force more or less attractive.

The Chinese case is illustrative in this regard. Beijing does not possess a formidable military today and it is certainly in no position to pick a fight with the United States. This is not to say that China is a paper tiger, but it does not have the capability to cause much trouble, even in the Asia-Pacific region. However, that situation is expected to change markedly over time, in which case China will have significant offensive capability. Then, we will see how committed it is to the status quo. But right now we cannot tell much about China's future behavior, because it has such limited capability to act aggressively.

What all of this tells us is that there is no good way to define what China's intentions will be down the road or to predict its future behavior based on its recent foreign policies. It does seem clear, however, that China will eventually have a military with significant offensive potential.

CHINA WILL REASONABLY INTERPRET U.S. POSTURE AS AGGRESSIVE

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

There is obviously no way China’s leaders can know who will be in charge of American foreign policy in the years ahead, much less what their intentions toward China will be. But they do know that all of America’s post-Cold War presidents, including Barack Obama, have stated that they are committed to maintaining American primacy.¹³ And that means Washington is likely to go to considerable lengths to prevent China from becoming too powerful.

Regarding capabilities, the United States spends nearly as much money on defense as all the other countries in the world combined.¹⁴ Moreover, because the American military is designed to fight all around the globe, it has abundant power projection assets. Much of that capability is either located in the Asia-Pacific region or can be moved there quickly should the need arise. China cannot help but see that the United States has formidable military forces in its neighborhood that are designed in good part for offensive purposes.¹⁵ Surely, when Washington moves aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Straits—as it did in 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the Western Pacific, China sees these naval assets as offensive, not defensive in nature.

This is not to deny that most Americans, like most Chinese, think that their military is a defensive instrument; but that is not the way it looks when you are at the other end of the rifle barrel.¹⁶ Thus, anyone in China seeking to gauge American intentions by assessing its military capabilities is likely to think it is a revisionist state, not a status quo power.

RECENT HISTORY MAKES IT REASONABLE TO INTERPRET U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS WARLIKE

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

Lastly, there is the matter of America's recent behavior and what that might tell us about future US actions. As I said earlier, past actions are usually not a reliable indicator of future behavior, because circumstances change and new leaders sometimes think differently about foreign policy than their predecessors. But if Chinese leaders try to gauge how the United States is likely to act down the road by looking at its recent foreign policy, they will almost certainly conclude that it is a war-like and dangerous country. After all, America has been at war for 14 of the 21 years since the Cold War ended. That is two out of every three years. And remember that the Obama administration is apparently contemplating a new war against Iran.

CURRENT ECONOMIC CONDITIONS MAKE CHINA'S RISE DESTABILIZING

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

The second factor is the crisis in the world economy since 2008 caused by the implosion of an over-extended financial sector and the consequent drying up of credit. This crisis will almost certainly have a major and sustained impact on China's strategy of export-led growth. The advanced capitalist economies will no longer be able to sustain anything like their previous levels of imports from China. And if the United States decides to inflate away (aka 'quantitative easing') the enormous debt its government has built up in the bond markets, of which China is the biggest holder, that would pull away one of the props that has stabilised US–China relations. If China is to keep up the levels of economic growth seen as necessary to maintain its socio-political stability, then it will have to find rapid and sustainable ways of expanding its domestic market. The relatively benign economic conditions that facilitated China's reform and opening up from the late 1970s appear to have come to an end, as has the ideological framing of the 'Washington consensus' within which China's opening up took place. It is far from clear either how long the present crisis will last, or what the restructured world economy will look like after it. Along with everybody else, China will have to adapt to this restructuring, and how it does so could be affected by the fact that its main political allies are of low economic interest to it, while its main economic partners, especially the United States and Japan, are, if not quite political enemies, still far from being friends. And as Legro points out, much of the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party hangs on maintaining the growth that has so far been generated by reform and opening up.⁵⁰

THE PREDOMINANCE OF REALIST THINKING IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY MAY MAKE FEARS OF CONFLICT A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

Part of the problem is that Realists, who are influential in the policy thinking of both countries, take the view that China's rise will inevitably lead at a minimum to rivalry and tension, and at a maximum to a major confrontation like those that attended the rise of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union.⁵⁵ As suggested not only by US policy discourse, but also by the durable 'China threat' literature⁵⁶ there is certainly a quite strong constituency in the United States that almost wants to cast China in the role of 'peer competitor' in order to restore the clarity of purpose to US foreign policy which has been hard to find since the end of the Cold War. If this constituency wins out in the United States, then it will be difficult for China to rise peacefully. It is therefore imperative that China do as little as it can to feed this constituency in the United States, and as much as it can to support the alternative lobby which seeks to strengthen the global political and economic order by bringing China into the world economy and international society. Even if the 'China threat' view does win out in the United States, it is still imperative for China to do its utmost to rise peacefully. If the Realists are correct, and the United States must feel threatened because China's rise, whether peaceful or not, inevitably puts into question the US's status as the sole superpower, there is nevertheless quite a good chance that no other major powers would feel threatened by a peacefully rising China. Those many voices currently in opposition to US hegemony, and speaking of the need for a more multipolar world order, might well welcome China's rise, though China will have to work harder to reassure near neighbours than those further away.

INTEGRATION INTO GLOBAL SOCIETY

CHINA IS RESISTENT TO MANY ASPECTS OF THE STATUS QUO INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

A status quo power is happy with both its status/rank and with the institutions of international society, which it accepts on an ideational level. I doubt that this is fully the case for China. Since the country is rising, it is almost by definition not satisfied with its status/rank and will seek to improve this in line with its rising wealth and power. While it has a permanent seat on the UNSC, it is not a member of the G8. It also seems clear that China is not entirely happy with all of the institutions of Western-dominated international society. It gives strong support to the pluralist institutions of coexistence: sovereignty, non-intervention, nationalism, territoriality, anti-hegemonism/balance of power, diplomacy, international law. But it is strongly opposed to the liberal political solidarist values of human rights and democracy, and up to a point also environmentalism. Other than opposing unipolarity and hegemonism, where it stands on the idea of multipolar great power management is unclear. Even though it is keen to increase its power status, China does not seem to want to assert its own claims to a leadership role, talking instead generally about greater democratisation of international society at all levels of power.⁴⁶ The nature of China's support for the market is also an interesting question. To put it bluntly, can a Communist government ever support the market ideationally, or must its support necessarily be not more than calculated? As Legro presciently noted, a really severe and sustained global economic crisis like the one we are now in may well expose whether China's commitment to the market, and 'reform and opening up', is instrumental or ideational.⁴⁷

WHILE CHINA ACCEPTS SOME INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, IT IS RESISTANT TO MANY NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

A reformist revisionist accepts some of the institutions of international society for a mixture of calculated and instrumental reasons. But it resists, and wants to reform, others, and possibly also wants to change its status. This sounds like the best description of China's position in contemporary international society. China accepts on an ideational basis the pluralist, coexistence institutions. It accepts at least instrumentally the market, resists the more politically liberal institutions, and wants to increase its status/rank. In line with its resistance to democracy, China is uncomfortable with the predominantly Western world society/global civil society, with which it does not deal well (most obviously in relation to Tibet), and which as Clark argues is a key driver of the normative deepening of international society (democracy, human rights, environment).⁴⁸

CHINESE GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

CHINA MAY HAVE TO TAKE ON MORE OF A LEADERSHIP ROLE THAN IT IS COMFORTABLE WITH IF THE U.S. DOES NOT RESTORE ITS LEGITIMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

The fourth factor is the crisis of US leadership in international society, raising the question whether international society is headed for a period of weaker and more divided leadership. This crisis derives as much from decline in the legitimacy of US leadership under the Bush administration as from any decline in its material power, and there is a lesson here for rising great powers about the importance of legitimacy in international society to great power status. Material capability is only one aspect of great power standing. The nature of this crisis is not at this point very clear. It could be that the Obama administration is substantially able to restore the legitimacy of US leadership. Or it could be that the Bush administration has so damaged the credibility of the liberal project, and so weakened the United States politically and economically, that US global leadership is no longer possible regardless of how well Obama does. Obama inherits such a weak and damaged position that it is difficult to see any restoration of a unipolar order, and therefore some decentralisation of leadership in international society seems inevitable.⁵¹ It is not clear how China will respond to this. It seems to have little desire to assert leadership itself, and given its shortage of soft power,⁵² insufficient global legitimacy to do so even if it wanted to. But it also seems ambivalent about the crisis in US leadership. One strand of Chinese discourse emphasises anti-hegemony and the need for a more multipolar international society, which suggests that China would be pleased by a weaker United States. Another strand emphasises international stability as the key requirement for China's ongoing development, which suggests that it would like to keep US leadership in place at least for the time being as a prop for its ongoing domestic development. This contradiction was easy to sustain when both the United States and the world economy were strong, but will be more difficult when both are weaker. China may well have a more explicit leadership role thrust upon it whether it wants it or not, and needs to make up its mind what it stands for.

THE INWARD-LOOKING CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE OF CHINESE LEADERS MAY LIMIT THEIR ENGAGEMENT NI GLOBAL POLITICS

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

These four factors, both singly and together suggest that there is little prospect of the next 30 years of China's peaceful rise looking anything like the past thirty. The international order that China has committed itself to joining, and particularly the economic order, is in trouble, and cannot carry on as it has been. The rise of China is in some ways part of that trouble, though mainly by accelerating the exposure of inbuilt structural constraints in terms of the environmental and financial limits of global capitalism. In some ways like Japan, China has played a supporter role, most obviously by propping up US debt in return for trade access. It has linked its own internal reform and development to an increasing opening up to the rules and structures of the global economy. Yet within 'reform and opening up' there is also a notable tendency within China to take a very self-centred view of its own development. This culturally referenced perspective is perhaps best symbolised for outsiders by the often-heard phrase 'Chinese characteristics', with its suggestion of an inward-looking type of national exceptionalism. Unlike the universalist pretensions of American liberalism, 'Chinese characteristics' points to a culturally unique way of doing things that is not necessarily relevant to those outside Chinese culture. This inward-looking perspective is also embodied in the arguments that China's main contribution to world order is simply to develop itself and rise peacefully.⁵³

CHINA'S INWARD-LOOKING TENDENCIES CAN CAUSE IT TO DISREGARD ITS RESPONSIBILITIES AS A GREAT POWER

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

These arguments, along with more quietly stated ones about not wanting to be seen as a challenger to the United States,⁵⁴ are used to excuse China's low-profile approach to the responsibilities of great power management. In effect, China is saying that its own problems of development are sufficiently huge that they absorb all of its capacity to manage, and that because China is so large a part of humankind, successful management of its own development will be of benefit of all. There are certainly significant elements of the truth in this view, as seen in the positive responses to such things as China lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, the benign effect of cheap Chinese exports on inflation in the West, and the idea that China has become one of the locomotives of the world economy. But that is not the whole story. The less benign side is reflected in the views that China's development contributes to global warming, drives resource depletion and high commodity prices, supports repressive regimes in the third world, comes at the expense of human rights, and creates an undemocratic great power that could turn nationalist and nasty. The tendency within China to take a benign self-view has some echoes of the 'Middle Kingdom' cast of mind, although this time without so much rejection of foreign ideas. Ironically, in cultivating it China makes itself look like the United States, which is also famous for the self-righteousness of its view that what the United States does must be right for the world because America is good, and represents the future of humankind. In taking this view, however, the United States can at least draw on a universalist liberal ideology that might in principle be applicable to the rest of the world. China does not have this kind of soft power (more on this below) or universalist ideology. Consequently, it is much less well placed than the United States to get its benign self-view accepted abroad. As the recent experience of the United States under the Bush administration demonstrated, great powers have a lot to lose when their self-perception gets badly out of line with how they are seen by other actors in the international system.

CLIMATE CHANGE WILL CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGE FOR CHINA'S RISE

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5-36

The third factor is the growing planetary environmental crisis, roughly coinciding with the peaking of human numbers, which is unfolding during this century. Environmental change is a kind of wild card in international relations. It could quickly and deeply change the nature of the game, but it is difficult to tell precisely when and how this will happen. The environmental crisis will be more durable, and could easily be far more transformational, than the economic crisis. Climate change, pollution, sea-level rise and the collapse of the oceans as a food resource, will all have major effects on the human political economy both globally and locally. China already has its own environmental problems (e.g. pollution, water shortage, flooding, epidemics), and it will not escape the global ones. If environmental changes come quickly and strongly (e.g. sea-level rises of several metres, and/or a runaway greenhouse effect) it is not difficult to imagine that they would transform the rules of the game of international society. What is more difficult to discern is the direction of that transformation, which could be either towards much higher levels of international cooperation, and even global governance, in pursuit of environmental stability, or towards much higher levels of conflict. The point here is that either way, the conditions for China's peaceful rise would be transformed.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY

CHINA IS LIKELY TO TRY TO EXPAND IT'S POWER IN ASIA BY PUSHING THE U.S. OUT

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History*, Apr 2006; 105, 690; Research Library pg. 160

China is likely to try to dominate Asia the way the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Specifically, China will seek to maximize the power gap between itself and its neighbors, especially Japan and Russia. China will want to make sure that it is so powerful that no state in Asia has the wherewithal to threaten it. It is unlikely that China will pursue military superiority so that it can go on a rampage and conquer other Asian countries, although that is always possible. Instead, it is more likely that China will want to dictate the boundaries of acceptable behavior to neighboring countries, much the way the United States makes it clear to other states in the Americas that it is the boss. Gaining regional hegemony, I might add, is probably the only way that China will get Taiwan back.

An increasingly powerful China is also likely to try to push the United States out of Asia, much the way the United States pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere. We should expect China to come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, as Japan did in the 1930s.

THE UNITED STATES IS LIKELY TO TRY TO WEAKEN CHINA TO MAINTAIN ITS STATUS AS THE WORLD'S ONLY REGIONAL HEGEMON

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History*; Apr 2006; 105, 690; Research Library pg. 160

It is clear from the historical record how American policy makers will react if China attempts to dominate Asia. The United States does not tolerate peer competitors. As it demonstrated in the twentieth century, it is determined to remain the world's only regional hegemon. Therefore, the United States can be expected to go to great lengths to contain China and ultimately weaken it to the point where it is no longer capable of ruling the roost in Asia. In essence, America is likely to behave toward China much the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the cold war.

CHINA'S NEIGHBORS ARE LIKELY TO ALLY WITH THE UNITED STATES TO PREVENT CHINA'S RISE INTO A REGIONAL HEGEMON

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "China's Unpeaceful Rise," *Current History*; Apr 2006; 105, 690; Research Library pg. 160

China's neighbors are certain to fear its rise as well, and they too will do whatever they can to prevent the Chinese from achieving regional hegemony. Indeed there is already substantial evidence that countries like India, Japan, and Russia, as well as smaller powers like Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it. In the end, they will join an American-led balancing coalition to check China's rise, much the way Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and even China joined forces with the United States to contain the Soviet Union during the cold war.

THERE ARE SEVERAL AREAS WHERE THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA COULD BE DRAGGED INTO A LAND WAR

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

Although the Soviet–American rivalry spanned most of the globe, the main battleground was in the center of Europe, where there was the danger of a large-scale conventional war for control of the European continent. That scenario was especially important to both sides not only because there was considerable potential for nuclear escalation in the event of a war, but also because a decisive Soviet victory would have fundamentally altered the global balance of power. It is hard to imagine similar circumstances involving China and the United States, mainly because Asia’s geography is so different from Europe’s. Korea is probably the only place where those two countries could get dragged into a conventional land war; in fact, that is precisely what happened between 1950 and 1953, and it could happen again if conflict broke out between North and South Korea. But the stakes and the magnitude of that conflict would be nowhere near as great as a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact for control of Europe would have been.

In addition to Korea, one can imagine China and the United States fighting over Taiwan, over disputed islands or islets off China’s coast, or over control of the sea lanes between China and the Middle East. As with Korea, the outcome of all of these scenarios would be nowhere near as consequential as a superpower war in the heart of Europe during the Cold War. Because the stakes are smaller and a number of the possible conflict scenarios involve fighting at sea—where the risks of escalation are more easily contained—it is somewhat easier to imagine war breaking out between the China and the United States than between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is also worth noting that there was no territorial dispute between the superpowers— Berlin included—that was as laden with intense nationalistic feelings as Taiwan is for China. Thus, it is not hard to imagine a war breaking out over Taiwan, which is not to say that the odds of such a war are high.

CHINA'S NEIGHBORS

IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF CHINA'S NEIGHBOR'S TO PLAY CHINA AND THE U.S. OFF OF EACH OTHER

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

If China is relatively benign in the sense of not using violence against its neighbours, and staying broadly within the rules of the global economic order, Europe will not care much about its rise, and will not feel threatened by it. Russia is a more complicated case, because it is one of China's neighbours, and has worries about Chinese designs on the sparsely populated territories of the Russian far east. Yet the two countries have developed a quite stable strategic partnership,⁵⁷ have many useful economic complementarities, share an interest in non-intervention and regime security, and Russia may well want to continue to align with China against the United States. India is also a complicated case, having to balance a growing economic relationship with China against some lingering territorial disputes and a desire not to be overshadowed in status terms by China. Unless China turns nasty and threatening, India will probably try to continue to play the United States and China against each other as it does now, leaving the main economic and political costs of balancing China to the United States.⁵⁸ There is even a possibility that Japan, China's nearest neighbour, might not, though this is probably the most difficult case (more on this later). If, because its rise cannot avoid threatening US sole-superpower status, China cannot reassure the United States, then the next best scenario for China is to ensure that only the United States be opposed to China, not the West as a whole or other the great powers. If the United States was alone in opposing China's rise there would be much less danger of any return to the highly confrontational bipolarity of the Cold War. A constrained version of peaceful rise might still be possible.

CHINA'S INCREASINGLY HOSTILE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN IS A THREAT TO THE U.S. POSITION IN EAST ASIA

Barry Buzan [Prof. of International Relations, London School of Economics], "China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?" *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 5–36

From the point of view of both China's peaceful rise and international high politics generally, China's relationship with Japan is perhaps the most important in the world. Yet it has been neglected by both countries, and there is a strong consensus among analysts of this topic that the relationship is bad and tending to get worse, with both sides in different ways to blame.⁶² While Japan and China interweave their economies ever more closely, their political relationship is little more than correct, and at a deeper level the relationship between their societies remains poisoned by history and is deteriorating. Political leadership has not done much to address this problem, and both have at times contributed to making it worse. Attitudes at the public level in both countries are becoming more estranged and hostile, raising the danger that they will soon be locked into a downward spiral in which each reaction is reciprocated in ways that make the rift deeper and wider and harder to resolve. The consequences of allowing this situation to continue are negative for both countries, but because Japan is the lynchpin of the US position in Asia, they are extremely negative for China's peaceful rise.

CHINA'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH NORTH KOREA HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY WORRISOME OVER THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Unfortunately, China has failed to maintain this positive momentum in its foreign policy, damaging U.S.-Chinese relations in the process. The most dramatic change is in its North Korea policy: rather than pressuring Pyongyang after its nuclear and missile tests in the spring of 2009, Beijing seems to have doubled down on its economic and political ties with Kim Jong Il's regime. Knowledgeable observers believe that trade and investment relations between China and North Korea have deepened over the past three years. There has also been frequent high-level public diplomacy between Chinese and North Korean leaders, including two visits by Kim to China last year. Last October, Zhou Yongkang, a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo Standing Committee, stood with top members of the Kim regime during the Korean Workers' Party's anniversary celebration. This attention was most welcome in Pyongyang during the regime's sensitive transition period, in which Kim has been grooming his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, to eventually take over.

Driven by the fear of a precipitous collapse of a neighboring communist regime and the reduction of Chinese influence on the Korean Peninsula, Beijing has fallen back on long-held conservative Communist Party foreign policy principles in backing North Korea. In particular, it stood by the Kim regime during the course of several crises sparked by Pyongyang last year. In May, an international commission determined that a North Korean submarine had indeed sunk the South Korean naval ship Cheonan in March; for its part, China refused to review the evidence and protected North Korea from facing direct criticism in the UN Security Council. In so doing, Chinese leaders alienated many in the international community, especially South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Beijing similarly protected North Korea from international condemnation after Pyongyang revealed last fall that it had secretly developed a uranium-enrichment facility. And then, after North Korea shelled a South Korean island in November, Beijing once again adopted an agnostic pose, simply calling for calm and warning all sides against any further escalation. The only specific warning it could muster was its ultimately unsuccessful effort to dissuade U.S. warships involved in joint U.S.-South Korean naval exercises from entering the Yellow Sea, which overlaps with China's exclusive economic zone.

THE DRIVE TO TAKE A STRONG LINE TO SHORE UP DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME HAS CAUSED CHINA TO HARM ITS ALREADY TENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH JAPAN

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

According to my sources in China, these factors produce two deleterious effects on Chinese foreign policy. First, for domestic and bureaucratic reasons, Beijing elites need to react stridently to all perceived slights to national pride and sovereignty. When, for example, various Asian states sided with Clinton at the ASEAN meeting in Hanoi, Chinese Foreign Ministry officials felt compelled to respond in caustic terms that alienated several of China's southern neighbors. The negative Chinese reaction to Japan's jailing of the fishing boat captain on domestic legal grounds was predictable, but the Chinese government was especially bellicose in its response: Beijing cut off rare-earth shipments to Japan and, perhaps most important, demanded an official apology and reparations after the Japanese had already acceded to Chinese demands to release the ship's captain and crew. This may have impressed domestic audiences in China, but it deeply alienated the Japanese public, which, according to recent polls, now holds very negative views of China. All of this trouble is occurring while the Democratic Party of Japan -- traditionally considered very accommodating to China -- is Japan's ruling party. The timing of the tense state of Chinese-Japanese relations thus speaks volumes about the opportunity costs of China's diplomatic truculence.

CHINA'S SUPPORT OF NORTH KOREA MAY BE A RESULT OF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEED TO MAINTAIN A HARD-LINE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Similarly, no one believes that China truly supports North Korea's military provocations or development of nuclear weapons. But Beijing's concerns about maintaining domestic stability in North Korea, peace on the Korean Peninsula, and social stability in China have prevented Chinese officials from criticizing North Korea publicly or allowing the UN Security Council to do so. What is more, these interests also keep Chinese officials from refuting conspiracy theories in the Chinese media and on the Internet that the United States and South Korea plotted to exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula to create an excuse to carry out military exercises near China's borders. To the contrary, the Foreign Ministry only fed the fire in July and November 2010 by warning the United States not to place warships in waters near China without Beijing's permission. This move may have won some favor within the Chinese military and the Chinese public, but the diplomatic costs of being seen to pardon or even defend Pyongyang's actions were high in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. A truly assertive great power would not allow a small pariah state to hijack its foreign policy in such a fashion.

IN THE NEAR FUTURE CHINA WILL PRESENT A SERIOUS MILITARY THREAT TO AUSTRALIA

John Mearsheimer [Prof. of Political Science, University of Chicago], "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 3, 2010, p. 381–396

One might be tempted to think that Australia's location means that it has little to fear from China and therefore it can stay on the sidelines as the balancing coalition to contain China comes together. Indeed, the 2009 White Paper raises the possibility that 'an Australian government might take the view that armed neutrality was the best approach in terms of securing its territory and people'.³¹ This is not going to happen, however, because China—should it continue its rapid rise—will eventually present a serious enough threat to Australia that it will have no choice but to join the American-led alliance to contain China. I would like to make three points to support this claim.

First, remember that we are not talking about the threat posed by today's Chinese military, which does not have a lot of power projection capability and is not much of a danger to its neighbors. We are talking about how Australians will think about China after it has undergone two more decades of impressive economic growth and has used its abundant wealth to build a military that is filled with highly sophisticated weaponry. We are talking about a Chinese military that comes close to rivaling the US military in terms of the quality of its weaponry. That Chinese military, however, should have two important advantages over its American counterpart. It should be larger, maybe even much larger, since China's population will be at least three times bigger than the US population by the middle of this century.³² Furthermore, the United States will be at a significant disadvantage in its competition with China because the American military will be projecting its power across 6000 miles of ocean, while the Chinese military will be operating in its own backyard. In short, China is likely to have far more offensive military power in 2030 than it has in 2010.

TAIWAN REMAINS A POTENTIAL FLASHPOINT FOR CONFLICT THAT COULD ESCALATE INTO NUCLEAR WAR

Charles Glaser [Prof. of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington University], "Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism," 90 *Foreign Aff.* 80 (2011)

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

RECENT U.S./CHINESE TENSIONS

IN RECENT YEARS CHINA'S POSTURE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN LESS PEACEFUL

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Over the past two years, in a departure from the policy of reassurance it adopted in the late 1990s, China has managed to damage relations with most of its neighbors and with the United States. Mistrust of Beijing throughout the region and in Washington is palpable. Observers claim that China has become more assertive, revising its grand strategy to reflect its own rise and the United States' decline since the financial crisis began in 2008. In fact, China's counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the United States are better understood as reactive and conservative rather than assertive and innovative. Beijing's new, more truculent posture is rooted in an exaggerated sense of China's rise in global power and serious domestic political insecurity. As a result, Chinese policymakers are hypersensitive to nationalist criticism at home and more rigid -- at times even arrogant -- in response to perceived challenges abroad.

A series of recent standoffs and tough diplomatic gestures certainly seem a world apart from China's previous strategy, set in the 1990s, of a "peaceful rise," which emphasized regional economic integration and multilateral confidence building in an effort to assuage the fears of China's neighbors during its ascendance to great-power status. Examples of China's recent abrasiveness abound. In 2009, Chinese ships harassed the unarmed U.S. Navy ship *Impeccable* in international waters off the coast of China. At the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum in July 2010, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi warned Southeast Asian states against coordinating with outside powers in managing territorial disputes with Beijing. Later that year, Beijing demanded an apology and compensation from Tokyo after Japan detained -- and then released, under Chinese pressure -- a Chinese fishing boat captain whose boat had collided with a Japanese coast guard vessel. Also in 2010, Chinese officials twice warned the United States and South Korea against conducting naval exercises in international waters near China -- even after North Korea sank a South Korean naval vessel in March, revealed a well-developed uranium-enrichment program in November, and then shelled a South Korean island, Yeonpyeong, that same month.

THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD TENSE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH CHINA

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Last year was also marked by bilateral tension between the United States and China over such issues as Chinese Internet hacking and media restrictions, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and U.S. President Barack Obama's meeting with the Dalai Lama. Even though U.S. policies on these issues were not new, the reaction in Beijing was more strident than in the past. China was also rankled by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's diplomacy regarding the management of sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting in Vietnam last July. China is the only nation in the region that claims all the disputed islands in the sea. Its expansive claims are also ambiguous, relying on maps that predate the People's Republic of China and sometimes on vague terms such as "historic waters," which carry no validity in international law. At the meeting, Clinton called for the peaceful settlement of differences, freedom of navigation, a legal basis for all claims rooted in customary international law, and multilateral confidence-building measures. Even though Clinton did not specifically name China and her comments did not change the United States' traditional neutrality on maritime sovereignty disputes, the U.S. initiative was unwelcome in Beijing. The Chinese foreign minister's harsh reaction at the conference -- warning regional actors against collaborating with outside powers in dealing with the disputes -- created tension between China and relevant ASEAN states and between China and Japan, which, like the United States, has no territorial claims in the South China Sea but is concerned about maintaining freedom of navigation there and regional security.

NATIONALIST PRESSURES IN RECENT YEARS HAVE MADE CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY MORE ASSERTIVE

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

What explains the acerbic turn in Beijing's foreign policy? Rather than a simple assertion of its newfound power, China's negative diplomacy seems rooted in a strange mix of confidence on the international stage and insecurity at home. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese citizens, lower-level government officials, and nationalist commentators in the media have often exaggerated China's rise in influence and the declining power of the United States. According to some of my Chinese interlocutors, top officials in Beijing have a much more sober assessment of China's global position and of the development challenges ahead. Yet those domestic voices calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy have created a heated political environment. Popular nationalism, the growth in the number of media outlets through which Chinese citizens can express their views, and the increasing sensitivity of the government to public opinion in a period of perceived instability have provided the space for attacks on the United States and, by association, criticism of Beijing's U.S. policy as too soft. These are the views of not just those far from power, however: the authors of such critiques have notably included active-duty military officers and scholars at state-run think tanks and universities.

NEW VOICES IN CHINESE POLICY-MAKING LEND CREDENCE TO NATIONALIST CRITICISMS

Thomas J. Christensen [Prof. of World Politics of Peace and War, Princeton University], "The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, May/April 2011.

Further complicating matters is the fact that an increasing number of bureaucracies have entered into the Chinese foreign-policy making process, including those of the military, energy companies, major exporters of manufactured goods, and regional party elites. This is a rather new phenomenon, and the top leadership seems unwilling or unable to meld the interests of these different groups into a coordinated grand strategy. Some of these domestic actors arguably benefit from China's cooperation with pariah states, expansive and rigid interpretations of sovereignty claims, and, in some cases, tension with the United States and its allies. They might benefit less -- or even be hurt -- by the sort of Chinese internationalism sought by the the European Union, Japan, South Korea, the United States, and others.

Therefore, nationalist pundits and bloggers in China find allies in high places, and top government officials are nervous about countering this trend directly. The result has been the creation of a dangerously stunted version of a free press, in which a Chinese commentator may more safely criticize government policy from a hawkish, nationalist direction than from a moderate, internationalist one.